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‘Rule of Law’ in China: The
Confrontation of Formal Law with
Cultural Norms
Larry A. DiMatteo†
This Article will be one of the first to fully examine the adoption of the
first part of China’s long-term quest to enact a grand civil code.  It is prima-
rily an examination of the interaction between law and culture— this inter-
action is most visible when law is transplanted from one legal tradition
(Western) into a country of a different legal tradition (Eastern).  The Gen-
eral Rules of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China took effect on
October 1, 2017.  This enactment of general principles is the first step in
what is expected to take up to five years to create a European-style civil
code.  There are multiple, interlocking themes to this Article.  First it
focuses on the general principles of contract law, comparing the current
Chinese Contract Law of 1999 with the General Rules of 2017.  This analy-
sis of general principles is not merely confined to contract law but reflects
the values and goals of Chinese society.  A second theme explores the effec-
tiveness and inherent problems of legal transplantation from one legal sys-
tem to another.  China is a unique example given the great mass of laws
adopted in its transition to a socialist-market economy.
The review of general principles and analysis of the effectiveness of
China’s transplantation of Western-style laws provides the basis for exami-
nation of the status of the “rule of law” in present day China.  The rule of
law is generally associated with public law, such as criminal and constitu-
tional law, and concepts such as due process.  This Article demonstrates
the importance of the rule of law in the more mundane area of private law,
in this case, the law of contracts.  The examination of the rule of law in
Chinese private law also has different dimensions.  First, the Article exam-
ines the pivotal role that Chinese cultural norms— Confucian and socialist
principles— has had in diminishing the rule of law in China.  Second, the
continued influence of government agencies and the low quality of the Chi-
nese judiciary has also held back the implementation of a rule of law sys-
tem in the private law realm.  The Article concludes with the use of a hard-
soft law paradigm to best understand the interaction of formal law and
cultural norms in modern China.
† Huber Hurst Professor of Contract Law, University of Florida, JD Cornell
University, LLM Harvard University, PhD Monash University.  I am grateful for the
invaluable help of Justin W. Evans and Jingen Wang in providing numerous sources and
citations to support many of the Article’s assertions.
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Introduction
[T]he political and civil laws of each nation must be proper for the people
for whom they are made, so much so that it is a very great accident if those
of one nation can fit another. . . . [The laws] must agree . . . with the customs
[of the people].
- Montesquieu1
This Article examines two divergences in the evolution of modern,
market-oriented law in the People’s Republic of China (China).  The first
divergence pertains to the difference between the intended meanings of
transplanted law in the country of origin and the borrowing country.  The
second divergence relates to the rule of law— the difference between the
1. Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 43, 44 (2001)
(quoting 1 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 7
(Thomas Nugent trans., Fred B. Rotham & Co. 1991) (1751)).
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objectivity of law as enacted and partiality of law as applied.2  The first
divergence relates to China’s massive transplanting of Western-style law
into an Eastern cultural and legal tradition.  This transplantation was broad
in scale and implemented with lightning speed given the broad sweep of
legal evolution.  Not surprisingly, there was a large divergence between
implementation and understanding, leading to wholesale confusion and
contradiction in the laws’ interpretation.  This divergence did not come as a
surprise given China’s Confucianist-Communist-Socialistic history.  There
was another divergence relating to the difference between the law on the
books and the law in interpretation.  If we assume uniformity of interpreta-
tion as an intended goal, other divergences have appeared between the
meaning of the borrowed law in the country of origin and the meaning
appropriated through the lens of Chinese cultural and socialistic norms.
This divergence has been problematic in the application of individual legal
rules and concepts as part of a body of holistic law.  However, such cultur-
ally tainted meanings should not be considered as a failure of transplanta-
tion, but as the necessary intermixing of formal law with cultural, social,
and legal norms of the accepting country.
At one level, the mass transplantation of Western-style law can be mea-
sured as a major success given the rapid expansion of China’s market-
export economy.  However, this shrouds the weakness of the Chinese court
system and its inability to comply with the rule of law.  This has been a
result of partiality and bias in the application of private law and the general
lack of objective legal reasoning due to the low quality of the Chinese judi-
ciary.  The movement of the law of the person, based on the omnipotence
of the Communist party and the hierarchical nature of roles in Confucian-
ism, to the rule of law still need further development.  With regard to the
low quality of the judiciary, the Chinese government— mostly through the
work of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC)— has taken steps to improve the
qualifications of judges and to obtain a more uniform application of law
throughout the Chinese court system.
This Article focuses on the importance of the rule of law and the appli-
cation of concepts such as fairness, justice, and due process in areas of
private law, such as contract law, as opposed to the areas where these con-
cepts receive more attention, such as constitutional, criminal, and human
rights law.  Chinese contract law provides an excellent case study of a
country trying to adopt the rule of law in private law while limiting its
application in the public sphere controlled by a Communist dictatorship.
This schizophrenic split of the rule of law is unique and perplexing.
A. China as a Civil Law Country
China’s gradualism in introducing formal (Western) law and recogniz-
ing contract and private property rights was best equipped to handle its
2. See William C. Jones, Trying to Understand the Current Chinese Legal System, in
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 7, 35– 36 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003) (discussing
the dichotomy between the law in theory and the law in practice in China’s contempo-
rary legal system).
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dramatic shift from a socialist-relational perspective of law’s role in society
to a private rights and formal law approach to managing legal relation-
ships.3  After the destruction unleashed by the Cultural Revolution, it is
understandable that the legal reforms begun by the Deng Xiaoping’s gov-
ernment in the late 1970’s and those that followed have been “so cautious
and gradual.”4
Just as the Chinese economy has accelerated in unprecedented fashion
over the last thirty-five years, the Chinese government has implemented a
massive expansion of Chinese law, most of which relates to the creation of
a market economy.  Almost the entire Chinese legal system has been cre-
ated over this period, whereas for western countries it took centuries.5  A
major part of this legal revolution is yet to be created— a grand or general
Chinese Civil Code.  This Article will examine the recently-promulgated
first part of the Code project.
On March 15, 2015, the Twelfth National People’s Congress of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China promulgated the first part of what is intended to
become China’s first comprehensive General Civil Code,6 entitled General
Rules of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (General Rules).7  The
law went into effect on October 1, 2017.  The idea of a comprehensive Chi-
nese Civil Code is not a new one, as tentative steps towards its creation can
be seen in various eras of modern China, including the late Qing Dynasty’s
(1902– 1911) production of a Draft Civil Code, the enactment of the first
Chinese Civil Code in 1930 by the Kuomintang (Republican Government),
and again in the early 1950s when a civil code was contemplated by the
new Chinese communist government.8  The Kuomintang Civil Code was
highly influenced by Chinese natural law theory, which focused on social
3. See Gil Lan, American Legal Realism Goes to China: The China Puzzle and Law
Reform, 51 AM. BUS L.J. 365, 425 (2014) (“China’s emphasis on gradualism allowed the
emergence of sociopolitical alignments of interests, which, at the time, better suited
China’s context.”).
4. Id. at 396.
5. It is important to understand the difference between substance and praxis as it
relates to Chinese law.  The massive amount of legislative activity was set in the context
of a Chinese judicial system ill equipped to understand and apply Western-style law.
For example, it was not until 2002 that judges were required to pass a national bar exam.
See Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 29 (2006).  Thus,
a divergence remains between the substantive law and its functional use, as well as
uncertainty in its application.  The independence and quality of the Chinese courts still
remains an issue and until that issue is solved the legal system will remain less than fully
functional. See id.
6. The Chinese government has committed itself to the adoption of a comprehen-
sive Civil Code over the next four years. See Communique of the 4th Plenary Session of
the 18th Central Committee of CPC, CHINA.ORG.CN (Dec. 2, 2014), available at http://
www.china.org.cn/china/fourth_plenary_session/2014-12/02/content_34208801.htm
[https://perma.cc/3ZE7-DVBU].
7. General Rules of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated
by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15 2017, effective from October 1, 2017), available at
https://www.dimt.it/images/pdf/GeneralRules.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GEJ-FSGT]
[hereinafter “General Rules”].
8. See Lei Chen, The Historical Development of the Civil Law Tradition in China: A
Private Law Perspective, 78 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGENSCHIEDENIS 159, 168– 69 (2010).
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harmony— the “we” over the “I” that favored conciliation and compromise
in social (contractual) relationships.  Thus, the Kuomintang Code is
“characterised by a concern for social order rather than unbridled individ-
ual interests.”9  This same communitarian theme persists in current Chi-
nese contract law and in the General Rules, which will be reviewed in this
Article.
Chinese leaders selected a civil law system, as opposed to a common
law system, because it was a better fit given the civil law’s reliance on gen-
eral principles or general clauses, which can be found in the code-like
precepts of Confucius, “while the individualistic common law approach
did not fit into a Chinese communitarian society.”10  The Chinese govern-
ment resurrected the idea of a civil code in the early 1980s, but this effort
was ultimately rejected.  In 1986, however, the National People’s Congress
adopted a short instrument of a mere 156 Articles entitled the General
Principles of the Civil Law (GPCL).11  The GPCL was a milestone in a
sense since it moved China toward a market economy, but it was not a
great leap forward in crafting a civil code because it retained the ideas of
public ownership of property and a “planned socialist commodity
economy.”12
Oddly, there is strong evidence of a common-law style of legal system,
based upon panwen (written legal documents) judgments or decisions, dat-
ing back to at least before the pre-Qin dynasty (before 221 B.C.).13  In this
context we see that although Chinese law subsequently evolved through the
use of civil-like codes,14 elements of the common law’s principle of prece-
dent or stare decisis had been firmly entrenched.  This is important in that
it shows that the Chinese legal tradition moved beyond the “law of per-
sons” or status based on Confucian principles, with panwen recognizing
the importance of the rule of law that similar decisions and punishments
should be prescribed for similar fact situations (also based upon Con-
9. Id. at 169 (citing CHEN JIANFU, FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORIZATION TO PRIVATE
LAW 14 (1994)).
10. Chen, supra note 8, at 165. See also Roscoe Pound, The Chinese Civil Code in
Action, 29 TUL. L. REV. 277, 289 (1955).
11. General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, (promulgated
by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective January 1, 1987).
12. Chen, supra note 8, at 176– 77. R
13. See Norman P. Ho, Confucian Jurisprudence in Practice: Pre-Tang Dynasty Panwen
(Written Legal Judgments), 22 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 49, 55– 56 (2013). See also Jialue
Charles Li, Note, China, A Sui Generis Case for the Western Rule-of-Law Model, 41 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 711, 737– 38 (2010) (discussing precedent in the Han and subsequent dynasties
and noting that Western scholars often ignore the role of precedent in ancient China).
However, it is important to note that the ancient Chinese legal system pre-dated Western
common and civil law systems. See JOHN W. HEAD & YANPING WANG, LAW CODES IN
DYNASTIC CHINA 3– 4 (2005) (noting that Chinese law predates and is distinguishable
from the civil and common law traditions); id. at 135 (discussing the role of codification
in civil and common law jurisdictions and distinguishing imperial China from both).
14. Chen, supra note 8. See also R. Randle Edwards, The Role of Case Precedent in the R
Qing Judicial Process as Reflected in Appellate Rulings, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL
SYSTEM 180, 180– 81 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003) (describing the ancient system in which
rarely-changed “statutes” were adopted verbatim by subsequent dynasties, but “sub-stat-
utes” evolved “in response to changing social needs”).
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fucian principles).15  Later, in the early nineteenth century, predictability
in the case law was demonstrated in partnership law, where the ability of
partnerships to contract and the survivorship of the partnership after the
death of a partner were universally accepted in some areas of China.16
The panwen system, which came into full force during the Han
dynasty (206 B.C– 208 A.D.), was based on the application of principles to
factual scenarios; analysis of context; and analogical reasoning from previ-
ously espoused panwen judgments.  During the Han dynasty different
types of panwen were developed using various types of reasoning.  Dong
Zhongshu was a key figure in developing the panwen system during the
Han Dynasty.  He used the Confucian text known as the Spring and
Autumn Annals to derive general principles to be used in legal decisions.17
Dong also created hypothetical or model panwen, which can be seen as the
precursor to the Chinese SPC’s current practice of issuing Guiding Opin-
ions.18  The principles derived from the Spring and Autumn Annals and the
model panwen, known as the Chunqiu Jueyu practice,19 were applied to
decide real cases.  This was a way of bringing more consistency and objec-
tivity to the legal system, which differs from the current Chinese court’s
15. It was in the second century B.C. that the Emperor Wu officially adopted Con-
fucianism as the guiding principles of government and society.  It remained official state
doctrine until 1911. See Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteris-
tics: China’s Discourse for the Rule of Law and a Bitter Experience, 24 TEMP. INT’L COMP.
L.J. 1, 33 (2010).
16. Mark Allee found that in at least one Chinese locality in the early 1800s, courts
treated partnerships as being capable of retaining or alienating contractual rights that
survived the individual natural persons constituting the partnership.  This arrangement
almost certainly “had important implications for the rationality and predictability of
economic transactions.” See Mark A. Allee, The Status of Contracts in Nineteenth-Century
Chinese Courts, in CONTRACT AND PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN CHINA 159, 167 (Madeleine
Zelin et al. eds., 2004).  Interestingly, the development of these contract principles pre-
dated the transplantation (or imposition) of any Western legal concepts beginning with
the Opium War era in the early 1840s.  The role of judicial precedent, Allee concludes,
was central to these contractual principles: “[These] cases suggest that, although the
statutes of codified law may appear indifferent at best, precedents established through
the findings of local courts were far from inimical to economic growth.” Id.
17. See Ho, supra note 13, at 81.
18. The Guiding Case or Opinions System was announced by the SPC on November
26, 2010; Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Work on Case Gui-
dance.  The first Guiding Case was issued on May 2, 2012 in Shanghai Centaline Property
Consultants Ltd. v. TAO Dehua, an intermediation contract dispute. See OU ZELIN, CHINA
GUIDING CASES PROJECT, DISCUSSING THE GUIDING CASE SYSTEM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERIS-
TICS BY FIRST COMBINING GUIDING CASE NO. 1 WITH ADJUDICATION PRACTICES 1, 2 (2012),
available at http://cgc.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/CGCP-English-
Commentary-4-Judge-Ou.pdf[https://perma.cc/ME5V-2S5T].  The SPC’s Guiding Cases
deal with specific issues taken from real cases, presented in a concise format. See gener-
ally, NANPING LIU, OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION IN
CHINA (1997) (background on the Guiding Cases in modern PRC jurisprudence); Mo
Zhang, Pushing the Envelope: Application of Guiding Cases in Chinese Courts and Develop-
ment of Case Law in China, 26 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 269 (2017) (analysis of the Guiding
Case system in place); Nanping Liu, Legal Precedents with Chinese Characteristics: Pub-
lished Cases in the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court, 5 J. CHINESE L. 107 (1991)
(examining the less formal, less authoritative prior practice of publication of SPC cases).
19. Ho, supra note 13, at 78– 79.
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inconsistent application of modern, Western-style laws.  In sum, like other
legal traditions, the legal traditions during the Han dynasty did not linearly
progress from a status-based law to a rule of law (freedom of contract), but
shows various mixtures of the two principles, with one type being more
dominant than the other at given times.
B. Modern Chinese Contract Law
The evolution and codification of a general contract code culminated
in the 1999 enactment of the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of
China, referred to as the Chinese Contract Law (CCL),20 and led to subse-
quent “interpretations” of the SPC.21  The CCL and SPC interpretations
can be seen as the first steps toward a general, uniform civil law of con-
tracts.  The new civil code, if completed as anticipated within the next five
years, will hopefully include a new and improved law of contracts.
The movement towards a grand Chinese civil code is the culmination
of the evolution of Western-style law in China following its shift to a par-
tially free-market, capitalistic economy in the early 1980s and before the
opening of the Chinese economy to international trade and investment.
The first generation of modern Chinese contract law evolved as a piece-
meal approach through the enactment of specialized bodies of contract law,
including a domestic Economic Contract Law,22 Foreign Economic Con-
tract Law,23 Technology Contract Law,24 and a Joint Venture Contract
Law,25 among others.  A major event that led the Chinese government to
embrace a more harmonized approach was its adoption of the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
20. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetong Fa [The Contract Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15,
1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), WIPO, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/
laws/en/cn/cn137en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MHT-B8GK] [hereinafter CCL].
21. The Supreme People’s Court supervises the work of the local people’s courts by
issuing “Interpretations” on various areas of law. See, e.g., Ashley M. Howlett, China’s
Supreme People’s Court Issues Clarification and Interpretation of the Contract Law, JONES
DAY (Mar. 2010), http://www.jonesday.com/china_supreme_peoples_court/.
22. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingji Hetong Fa [The Economic Contract Law of
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 13, 1981,
effective July 1, 1982), MINISTRY COM. CHINA, available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200211/20021100053738.html [https://perma.cc/B5J4-
QETD].
23. People’s Republic of China Foreign Economic Contract Law, United States Govern-
ment, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 1 Daily Report: China, March 25,
1985, at K 12 (translation), available at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol6/
iss1/3 [https://perma.cc/MS3F-KCMU].
24. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jishu Hetong Fa [Technology Contract Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.
,June 23, 1987, effective Nov. 1, 1987), CONSULATE GEN. CHINA N.Y., available at http://
newyork.china-consulate.org/eng/xbwz/kjsw/zgkj/t31701.htm [https://perma.cc/
F9C7-96CN].
25. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa [Law of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures] (promulgated by the Nat’l
People’s Cong., effective July 1, 1979), CHINA.ORG.CN, available at http://www.china.org
.cn/english/DAT/214773.htm [https://perma.cc/2WZN-7TQU].
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(CISG) in 1988.26  The CISG represented China’s first experience with an
internationally-harmonized private law instrument.  It also led to the devel-
opment of a higher level of expertise in the Chinese court system, espe-
cially in Chinese arbitration tribunals.  For example, the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC),27
China’s premier international arbitration association, has demonstrated a
somewhat astonishing grasp of the CISG and has proven its ability to inter-
pret and apply Western-style laws in a non-biased manner.
The CISG and its application in China provided a model for construct-
ing a harmonized Chinese law of contracts.  Eleven years after the adoption
of the CISG, the Chinese government adopted the CCL, which became
effective on October 1, 1999.  The law repealed the former specialized laws
of contract, such as the Chinese domestic Economic Contract Law and the
Foreign Economic Contract Law, and replaced them with a single law that
covered both domestic and international contract transactions.28  The CCL
is the second generation of modern Chinese contract law.  Hopefully, the
new civil code will incorporate a third generation of contract law that will
resolve the gaps and inconsistencies in the CCL.
Part I reviews the 1999 CCL and its sources and coverage.  It also
focuses on the general CCL principles espoused in articles 1– 9, which will
be compared in Part II with the general principles enunciated in the Gen-
eral Rules.  Part II also examines the general principles of the General Rules,
along with its specific provisions dealing with capacity and expressions of
intent.  Part III sets the context for evaluating the placement of the general
principles in modern Chinese contract law by examining the role of Con-
fucian and socialistic values on how the rule of law is viewed by Chinese
society.  Part IV provides an extended analysis of how the Western concept
of “good faith” has been applied in the context of Chinese cultural norms.
Part V proposes the construct of hard and soft law as a way to better under-
stand the application of transplanted Western-style law in the Chinese legal
system.  The view of Chinese law as a mix of hard and soft law shows that
the notion of China as a rule of law society remains somewhere in the
future.
I. Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (CCL)
The enactment of the CCL was a milestone in Chinese legal develop-
ment that led to the establishment of a market economy.  It harmonized a
26. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Vienna, 11 April 1980, S. Treaty Document No. 98– 99 (1984), UN Document No. A/
CONF 97/19, 1489 UNTS 3.
27. CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, http://
www.cietac.org/?l=EN [https://perma.cc/38DG-SYZ3]; see generally Larry A.  DiMatteo,
Contractual Excuse under the CISG: Impediment, Hardship and the Excuse Doctrines, 27
Pace Int’l L. Rev. 261 (2015).
28. The CISG remains China’s international sales law, but in non-sales international
transactions the CCL is the applicable law.
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piecemeal set of contract laws into a thick, comprehensive set of rules
based upon Western legal tradition.
A. Sources and Coverage
The CCL is an improvement over the earlier nascent contract laws
because it harmonizes Chinese contract law into a single instrument, is a
more modern law, and is a relatively comprehensive instrument with 428
articles.  The CCL provides both a general law of contract, like the com-
mon law, and specialized rules that are applicable to different contract-
types more aligned with the nominate contracts in Roman and modern
civil law.29  Its “general provisions” follow the Western-style template of
rules covering the formation, performance, termination, and remedies
related to breach of contract.  The “specific provisions” parts provide par-
ticularized rules for different types of contracts involving the sale of goods
(domestically), gifts (charitable subscriptions), leasing, lending, financial,
services, construction, carriage of goods, technology transfers, deposits,
bailment, agency, and brokerage.  This follows a civil law approach, in con-
trast to the common law of contracts, which applies directly to many of the
listed contracts in the Chinese law’s specific provisions.  Similarly, in the
United States legal system, the passage of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) provided specialized rules for commercial contracts involving the
sale of goods, leasing of goods, negotiable instruments, secured transac-
tions (financing), wire transfers, documents of title, letters of credit, and
bulk transfers.30
The drafters of the CCL, in their quest to enunciate a truly Western-
style, modern free-market contract law, borrowed from a host of different
sources, including the CISG, UNIDROIT, Principles of International Com-
mercial Contracts (PICC),31 Principles of European Contract Law
(PECL),32 German Civil Code (BGB),33 American UCC, and the common
law, among others.  The problem with the use of so many different sources
29. A “nominate contract” is a standardized contractual relationship that has a spe-
cial designation attached to it, such as purchase and sale, lease, loan, and insurance
contracts.  For example, Justinian identified four types of real contracts, including con-
tracts in re (in a thing), mutuum (loan for consumption), commodatum (loan for use),
depositum (deposit), and pignus (pledge). See BARRY NICHOLS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ROMAN LAW 167 (1962).
30. The Articles of the UCC include: General Provisions (Art. 1), Sale of Goods (Art.
2), Lease of Goods (Art 2A), Negotiable Instruments (Art. 3), Bank Deposits and Collec-
tions (Art. 4), Wire Transfers (Art. 4A), Letters of Credit (Art. 5), Bulk Sales (Art. 6),
Documents of Title (Art. 7), Investment Securities (Art 8), and Secured Transactions
(Art. 9), available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc [https://perma.cc/ZU44-35ZL].
31. INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIV. L., UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2010), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/
principles/contracts/principles2010/integralversionprinciples2010-e.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A9D6-MNJC].
32. COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT
LAW, PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando ed., 2000), available at https://www.trans-lex.org/4002
00/_/pecl [https://perma.cc/8BRN-J9V8].
33. BU¨RGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code], translation at http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/englisch_bgb [https://perma.cc/7VRF-6QVN] (Ger.).
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is that it led to numerous gaps and inconsistencies in the CCL.34  For
example, the CCL borrowed many of the formation rules found in the
CISG, but failed to adopt the full set of acceptance rules, leading to a gap
subject to different interpretations of if and when a late acceptance leads to
a conclusion of a contract.35  In the area of insecurity of performance, the
CCL adopts two types of protections with different sets of rules— defense of
insecurity, taken from German law, and anticipatory breach, taken from
the CISG and the common law.  The result is an overlapping system of
rules dealing with similar real-world situations, leading to a great deal of
inconsistencies in the law and in its application.36
B. General Principles of the CCL
The CCL has three key objectives set out in Article 1 CCL: (i) to pro-
tect the lawful rights and interest of the contracting parties; (ii) to maintain
social and economic order; and (iii) to promote socialist modernization.
The principles set out in subsequent articles serve two functions: (i) to
guide the interpretation of specific substantive provisions of the CCL and
(ii) to be used as a basis on which gaps in the CCL could be bridged when
adjudicating a particular matter.37
The first general principle underpinning all contractual agreements is
that of “equality” as found in Article 2’s recognition that the parties are
equal and Article 3’s obligation that no party may impose its will upon the
other party.  This suggests that no coercion in the process of contract for-
mation or contract performance is permissible.  However, this general
assumption leaves unclear what should happen if there are clear instances
of an inequality in the position of the parties: “The one thing that is per-
haps missing from the CCL’s agreement-based definition of the nature of
the contract is that it is not specified that the agreement must be intended
by the parties to have the force of law, or— to put it another way— that in
making the agreement the parties are demonstrating consent to be bound at
law.”38  The importance of intention in the bindingness of contractual obli-
gations is clearly implied in the General Rules.39
34. See LARRY A. DIMATTEO & LEI CHEN, CHINESE CONTRACT LAW: COMPARATIVE PER-
SPECTIVES, 18, 21, 50, 403, 466, (2017).
35. See Jingen Wang & Larry A. DiMatteo, Western Reception and Transplantation of
Western Contract Law, 34 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 44, 45 (2016).
36. For example, the CCL adopted both the common law concept of anticipatory
repudiation (breach) and the civil law concept of defense of security.  These doctrines
serve similar purposes but diverge in the area of application. See CCL, supra note 20, at
arts. 68, 69, 94 and 108.
37. See DIMATTEO & CHEN, supra note 34, at 45.
38. Id. at 117– 18.
39. See General Rules, supra note 7, at arts.: 133 (“civil juristic acts . . . [include] the
establishment, alteration, and termination of civil legal relations through an expression
of intention”); 137 (“expression of intention, which is made by dialogue, takes effect
when the person knows the content”); and 140 (“persons of civil conduct may make an
expression of intention by express or implied ways”).
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The second principle is that of “voluntariness,” or party autonomy,40
found in Article 4 CCL, according to which parties have “the right to volun-
tarily conclude contracts.”  This concept includes the prohibition that “no
unit or individual may illegally intervene therein,” which still leaves open
the possibility for restrictions imposed by law on the exercise of the right
to conclude a contract.  It seems that the principle of “voluntariness”
should not be equated too readily with the notion of freedom of contract
which is the hallmark of the common law of contract (and, indeed, of all
Western legal systems);41 rather, it might better be understood as freedom
to contract.  This is more than just semantics— as the discussion of the
common law approach will show, freedom of contract is about much more
than just enabling parties to enter into legally binding agreements.
Article 3 may be read in different ways.  It can be seen as a further
emphasis on the importance of freedom of contract as articulated in Article
2.  Or, it can be interpreted as focusing on abuse of bargaining power.  It
states that “parties are equal in their legal status, and no party may impose
his own will upon the other party.”  The phrase “equal in their status” may
be a simple recognition that all civil parties have the freedom to enter into
contracts.  However, the phrase “no party may impose his own will upon
the other party” is vague.  It could be viewed narrowly as simply encom-
passing cases of fraud or coercion (duress) found elsewhere in the CCL.
Or, it could be broadly construed as preventing a party with superior bar-
gaining power of overreaching by negotiating a highly one-sided contract.
The broader interpretation would recognize a principle not seen in other
legal systems.
Article 4 can also be seen as ancillary to the principle of freedom of
contract.  It states that everyone has the “right to voluntarily conclude con-
tracts.”  Freedom of contract is further reinforced by Article 8, which states
“contracts concluded according to law are legally binding on the parties.”
The behavior of the parties to a contract is then regulated by the third
and fourth general principles: first, in determining their respective rights
and duties, the parties must observe the “principle of fairness” (Article 5);
secondly, in exercising their rights and performing their duties, parties
must observe the principle of “good faith” (Article 6).  Unfortunately, the
CCL fails to provide factors directly relevant to the application of Articles 5
and 6, leaving it for the courts to specify the factors that will be relevant in
establishing whether both parties have complied with the threshold
requirements of fairness and good faith.  There are other provisions in the
CCL, particularly on good faith, which provide greater detail: Article 42
CCL holds a party liable for (i) negotiating in bad faith; (ii) intentionally
40. See Zhang Yuqing & Huang Danhan, The New Contract Law in the People’s Repub-
lic of China and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: A Brief
Comparison, 5 UNIFORM L. REV. 429, 431 (2000).
41. See JUNWEI FU, MODERN EUROPEAN AND CHINESE CONTRACT LAW: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF PARTY AUTONOMY 39 (2011); Junwei Fu, Towards a Social Value Convergence: A
Comparative Study of Fundamental Principles of Contract Law in the EU and China,
OXFORD UNIV. COMPARATIVE L. F. 4– 5 (2009).
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concealing a fact or providing wrong information; and (iii) any other
instance which violates the principle of good faith.  This suggests that two
of the key aspects of “good faith” are honesty and transparency.  Moreover,
Article 60 requires that the parties observe the principle of good faith in
performing their obligations.
The fifth general principle can be summarized as the “compliance with
public interest.”  “Although China has moved towards a rule of law system,
public policy still plays an important role.”42  Since fairness is singled out
as a public policy concern, the “Chinese courts work more like a court of
equity rather than a court of law in an effort to promote fairness.”43  Thus,
Article 7 specifies that parties must act in accordance with relevant laws
when concluding and performing a contract, respect public morals, and
not disturb the social and economic order nor harm the public interest.
What seems like a reasonable obligation imposed on the parties could
potentially form the basis for far-reaching intervention into the contracting
process— from negotiation to content to performance.
Professors Wang Liming and Xu Chuanxi have argued that the general
principles of the CCL can be categorized as serving three fundamental val-
ues— “freedom of contract (hetong ziyou), good faith (chengxin), and the
fostering of transactions (guli jiaoyi).”44  The principles of freedom of con-
tract and good faith are contractual bedrock.  All contract laws are pre-
mised on the freedom of parties to create their own private law (contract).
Almost all contract law systems recognize the principle of good faith as a
means of facilitating contractual exchange (filling gaps and interpreting
contracts) and as a policing mechanism to regulate abuse of freedom of
contract.
The more interesting principle flagged by Wang and Xu is the princi-
ple of the fostering of transactions.  This principle must be placed in the
context of the first generation of contract laws, such as the Economic Con-
tract Law and the Foreign Economic Contract Law, and their shortcomings
and the advancement of a more modern unified contract by the enactment
of the 1999 CCL.  They argue that the earlier contract laws too often invali-
dated contracts by only recognizing the remedy of voidness and not
voidability, as well as invalidating contracts due to ambiguity.  In contrast,
provisions of the CCL foster contractual exchange, when the parties indi-
cate a general intent to enter a contract, as well as giving the victim of an
invalidating act the right to reaffirm the contract (voidability).
A brief review of the main differences between the CCL and its prede-
cessor laws will illustrate the contract friendly nature of the CCL.  First,
Article 58 of the GPCL renders void all contracts where there is evidence of
duress, fraud, or exploitation of a party’s vulnerability.  Under the CCL,
the victim of such conduct has the right to enforce or seek termination.
42. John H. Matheson, Convergence, Culture and Contract Law in China, 15 MINN. J.
INT’L L. 329, 380 (2006).
43. Id.
44. Wang Liming & Xu Chuanxi, Fundamental Principles of China’s Contract Law, 13
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 2 (1999).
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Thus, more contracts deemed to be invalid per se under the previous law
are now fully enforceable.  Second, the previous contract laws automati-
cally terminated contracts if they violate a law or regulatory provision.  The
CCL requires that such termination only apply to national-level laws and
regulations.45  Third, since the previous laws did not provide rules of inter-
pretation, if courts were faced with a contractual ambiguity, then they com-
monly held the contract to be invalid due to the ambiguity (lack of mutual
assent).  In contrast, the CCL provides a number of rules of interpretation,
which essentially force the courts to fill in the gaps of an otherwise viable
contract.46  Article 38 requires that standard terms shall comply with the
principle of fairness.  Article 41 provides that: (1) standard terms “shall be
interpreted in accordance with the usual understanding of the term;” (2)
the term is to be interpreted in a way least favorable to the drafter if there is
more than one reasonable interpretation; and (3) if in conflict, a non-stan-
dard term prevails over a standard term.  Article 62 provides a number of
gap fillers, including a quality term (“contract shall be performed in accor-
dance with the state standard or industry standard”);47 price term (“mar-
ket price prevailing in the place of performance at the time of the
conclusion of the contract”);48 performance (“obligation to pay money
shall be performed at the place where the party receiving the money
resides” and “in regard to other subject matters, the obligation shall be
performed at the place where the party performing the obligation
resides”);49 and time of performance (“debtor may perform the contract at
any time and the creditor may demand performance at any time, but the
other party shall be given the necessary time for preparation”).50  It is
important to note that even though the CCL was a major advancement in
the development of a Western-style contract law, over the contract laws that
came before, it should be viewed as transitional in nature.  The CCL needs
to be replaced by a third-generation law, one that hopefully fixes the ambi-
guities, gaps and inconsistencies that have become apparent in the nearly
twenty years of experience in the application of the CCL.51
II. General Rules of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China
This part reviews the General Rules of Civil Law beginning with the
structure and coverage of its six chapters: General Principles, Legal Capac-
ity, Legal Persons, Non-Incorporated Organizations, Civil Rights, and Civil
Juristic Acts.  It then focuses on the ten substantive principles found in
45. See CCL, supra note 20, at art. 52.
46. See CCL, supra note 20, arts. 38 (standard terms), 41 (standard terms), 53
(exemption clauses), 62 (gap-fillers) & 63 (price), and 66 (sequence of performance).
47. Id. at art. 62(1).
48. Id. at art. 62(2).
49. Id. at art. 62(3).
50. Id. at art. 62(4).
51. See, e.g., Wang & DiMatteo, supra note 35 (gaps in late acceptance rules and
right to cure overlap between defense of insecurity and anticipatory breach).
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Articles 1-10 before briefly discussing the provisions on capacity and
expression of intention.
A. General Structure
This initial part of what is intended to be the enactment of a grand
civil code consists of 206 articles.  It is important to note that the title to
this 2017 law begins with “General Rules.”  It will thus play a crucial role
in the framing of the rest of the code.  Initial interpretation of its articles
will be vitally important in setting the tone for the entire code.  As with the
CCL, General Rules include potentially conflicting principles and articles
due to the remaining influence of Chinese customary law and socialist
principles.  The first twelve articles making up Chapter I, much like what is
found in the CCL, provide the general principles to be used in the interpre-
tation and application of the specific rules enunciated in the General Rules,
as well as parts of the civil code to be promulgated in the future.  A detailed
analysis of the general principles will be undertaken below.
Chapter II covers the areas of legal capacity including the rights of
minors to enter into contracts,52 guardianship,53 declarations relating to
death and missing persons,54 the status of business organizations, and
leased farm owners.55
Chapter III is entitled “Legal Persons.”  It consists of some forty-five
articles56 and covers not only natural persons, but also an assortment of
business organizations including for-profit and not-for-profit businesses or
organizations, along with “special persons.”  Special persons cover an array
of government, quasi-government, and communal organizations.  The con-
tinuing existence of collective farms, a holdover from the previous commu-
nist-socialist view of property, means that the ownership of farming land is
based upon contract rights and not real property rights.  The title to the
land is held by the collective and not by the individual farmers.  Article 99
states that: “The rural collective economic organisations shall obtain the
legal personality according to law.”  This type of system is a product of the
historical creation of the communist system in China before its transition
into a market economy.  Farm cooperatives exist in the United States, but
they mainly serve the purposes of marketing and selling goods of small-to
medium-sized farms, which are privately owned.
Chapter IV regulates “non-incorporated organizations,” which are
defined as “organizations that have no legal personality but may lawfully
engage in civil activities under their own names.”57  These types of entities
can be seen as variants of Western business organizations, such as partner-
ships, limited liability companies, and professional associations.  However,
under American law, the limited partnership (LP), limited liability com-
52. General Rules, supra note 7, at arts. 13– 25.
53. Id. at arts. 26– 39.
54. Id. at arts. 40– 53.
55. Id. at arts. 54– 56.
56. Id. at arts. 57– 101.
57. Id. at art. 102.
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pany (LLC), limited liability partnership (LLP), and the professional asso-
ciation (PA) all provide limited liability protection for its partners and
members.  Chapter IV provides that: “If the property of the non-incorpo-
rated organization is insufficient to pay off the debts, investors or the foun-
ders shall bear unlimited liability.”58
Chapter V is a wide-ranging section covering “Civil Rights.”59  But the
notion of civil rights is construed to include property rights and is not a
listing of fundamental human rights as can be found in the American Bill
of Rights60 or the United Nation Universal Declaration on Human Rights of
1948.61  Instead, its focus is on individual property rights.  Again, this is a
product of the continuing transition from public to private ownership of
property.  Chapter V covers such areas as property rights,62 contract
rights,63 privacy rights,64 intellectual property rights,65 as well as the right
to bring actions for breach of contract, tort,66 and unjust enrichment.67
Other provisions provide for fundamental human rights but are couched in
vague, general, and abstract phraseology.68
Chapter VI entitled “Civil Juristic Acts” provides a brief framework of
contract law.  It covers the requirements of contract and contract forma-
tion; conditions;69 defenses concerning validity relating to breach of con-
tract, such as “fake expression of intent,”70 mistake,71 fraud,72 duress,73
and unfairness;74 limitation periods (statute of limitations);75 termina-
tion;76 contract interpretation;77 and restitution.78  Although this litany of
provisions covers many areas of contract law, it is vastly short of being a
comprehensive contract law in itself.  It is strange that the drafters placed
substantive contract law rules in the General Rules.  One explanation is this
cursory list of contract law rules serves as a preamble to necessarily more
comprehensive bodies of rules and principles— laid out in independent
parts, such as the law of persons and the law of obligations— of the general
58. Id. at art. 104.
59. Id. at arts. 109– 32.
60. U.S. CONST. amends. I– X.
61. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
62. General Rules, supra note 7, at arts. 113– 17.
63. Id. at art. 119.
64. Id. at arts. 111 & 127.
65. Id. at art. 123.
66. Id. at art. 120.
67. Id. at art. 122.
68. See id. at art. 109 (“personal freedom and personal dignity”); id. at art. 110
(“right to life, health rights, physical rights,” as well as the “right of honour”); id. at art.
132 (“civil subjects shall not abuse civil rights and damage the national interests”).
69. Id. at arts. 158– 59.
70. Id. at art. 146.
71. Id. at art. 147.
72. Id. at arts. 148– 49.
73. Id. at art. 150.
74. Id. at art. 151.
75. Id. at art. 152.
76. Id. at art. 152.
77. Id. at art. 142.
78. Id. at art. 157.
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civil code to be enacted in the future.  This must be the intent of the draft-
ers since the General Rules do not repeal the CCL; that will only come if the
law of obligations is later added to the General Rules.  This raises questions
regarding the motivation behind placing a hodge-podge set of rules on con-
tract law in the first part of what is to become a general civil code.  Also,
left unanswered is how are these contract rules to be applied vis-a`-vis the
CCL?  These questions will be discussed in a later section.  The General
Rules conclude with a chapter on agency law,79 civil liability,80 and general
limitation periods.81
B. General Principles
This part will examine the general principles enunciated in the first
ten articles of the General Rules.  More specifically, the analysis will focus
on the general principles and their application to contract law— interpreta-
tion of contract law rules and the interpretation of contracts.  This focused
analysis is due to two factors.  Much of the General Rules, as discussed
above, are directly related to contract law (rules on intention to be bound,
capacity, defenses and validity of contracts, limitation period, and agency
law).  Second, the principles in the General Rules can be compared to the
general provisions found in the CCL.  In the latter case, this will allow a
longitudinal analysis of changes to the values advanced in the 1999 CCL
with the 2017 General Rules.
1. Rule of Persons and Rule of Law
The ten general principles provided in the General Rules include a mix
of freedom of contract and freedom of contract-restricting values.  A blend
of Western-capitalistic values with Confucian-socialistic norms are repre-
sented in Article 1, which call for the new law to be “adapt[ed] to the
requirements of the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics,
and carrying forward socialist core values.”82  The phrase “Chinese charac-
teristics” can be traced to Deng Xiaoping who was the supreme leader of
China from 1978 to 1997, and was the force behind China’s opening up to
Western trade and investment, as well as beginning the transition to a mar-
ket economy.83  Prior to Deng, China’s Communist-Socialist system was
based substantially on the Soviet model.84  That model was based on a
79. Id. at arts. 161– 75.
80. Id. at arts. 176– 87.
81. Id. at arts. 188– 205.
82. Id. at art. 1.
83. See Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Socialist Legal Theory in Deng Xiaoping’s China, 11
COLUM J. ASIAN L. 469, 470 (1997).
84. See Yu Xingzhong, Comment, Legal Pragmatism in the People’s Republic of China,
3 J. CHINESE L. 29, 32 (1989).  The Soviet law influence on China began to wane begin-
ning with Mao Zedong’s split with the Soviet Union and the near destruction of the
Chinese legal system during the Cultural Revolution. See, e.g., ODD ARNE WESTAD, REST-
LESS EMPIRE 343 (2012) (discussing Mao’s role in destroying the Sino-Soviet relationship
in the early 1960s); JOHN KING FAIRBANK & MERLE GOLDMAN, CHINA: A NEW HISTORY 398
(2d enlarged ed. 2006) (discussing the ways in which Mao’s policies diverged from the
Soviet Union).  And even when Chinese law borrowed from Soviet law, Maoist law also
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centralized planned economy.  Deng declared that it was important that
China move away from the Soviet model and create a model of socialism
(including a socialistic economy) based upon “Chinese characteristics.”85
At this time, the idea of a socialist market economy was still viewed in the
context of the law as being instrumental to advancing the policies of the
State.
At the same time, Deng’s major contributions were advancing the view
that all citizens were equal before the law— shifting the Mao mindset that
viewed the law as the “rule of persons” (instrumental to government-con-
trol of the people) to “rule of law” in which the government is subservient
to the law.86  In the end, Deng’s view of rule of law was not one that would
diminish the power of the State and the Communist Party.  Instead, he
advanced the notion that law should be a vehicle for the creation of individ-
ual wealth and, thus, the use of the legal system and the application of law
should aim to improve the material well-being of the people.87  Thus, even
though the State and the Communist Party remain the dominant forces in
China, the broadening of the rule of law has reduced the role of these enti-
ties in economic life.  More importantly, under rule of law, the judiciary
becomes superior to the Party.  This is clearly not the case at present, but
the idea remains robust and should influence legal development in the
future.
2. Normative Tension
All contract law systems demonstrate underlying tensions between the
dominant value of freedom of contract and an assorted number of princi-
ples aimed at curtailing abuse of that freedom.  For example, the principle
of good faith is recognized by almost all national legal systems, whether
civil or common law.  At one end of the spectrum, German law places an
extraordinary emphasis on the principle of good faith in the interpretation
and enforcement of contracts.88  At the other end, English law continues to
reject an implied duty of good faith in contracts.89  It has become an outlier
as other common law systems such as those of Australia,90 Canada,91  New
drew from other sources including civil law, common law, and ancient Chinese legal
traditions, as well as Mao’s own Communistic philosophy. See Victor H. Li, The Role of
Law in Communist China, 44 CHINA Q. 66, 74 (1970).
85. Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, supra note 83, at 470.
86. See id. at 469, 475– 78.
87. Id. at 475.  Deng viewed the formal law as a means to facilitate wealth creation,
but not a Western-style rule of law. See JUNE T. DREYER, CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM 5 (9th
ed. 2014) (noting that Deng’s view of the rule of law was not democratic or civil-liberta-
rian but purely instrumental; it was “necessary to resolve disputes . . . before the wheels
of production could hum smoothly.”).
88. See BU¨RGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 242, translation at https://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html [https://perma.cc/BUD6-SU39]
(Ger.).
89. But see Yam Seng Pte Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Corp. [2013] EWHC (QB) 111, [153]
(Eng.) (noting that the duty of good faith can be recognized as an implied-in-fact con-
tract term).
90. See Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26
NSWLR 234, 263– 64 (Austl.).
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Zealand,92 and the United States93 recognize the principle as an implied
term in all contracts.  However, the common and civil laws continue to
diverge in the area of whether there is a duty of good faith negotiations and
the consequences of bad faith conduct in the pre-contract stage.  Most civil
law countries recognize pre-contractual liability for bad faith negotiations
including a tort claim of contra in contrahendo.94  Although the United
States has recognized the claim of promissory estoppel that allows for the
recovery of reliance damages in certain cases involving pre-contractual
promises,95 the common law continues to reject the duty of good faith in
pre-contractual negotiations.
The other major counterpoise to unfettered freedom of contract is the
notion of fairness of contract, or what James Gordley referred to as “fair-
ness of an exchange.”96  Unlike the duty of good faith, the principle of
fairness has been more problematic to incorporate into contract law.  Good
faith can be seen as an implied term because it is a common assumption
that business parties expect each other to act in good faith.  This assump-
tion often rests on good faith as a trade usage or of mutual benefit to both
parties in encouraging the completion of contractual performance.  In con-
trast, the value of fairness is a direct assault on freedom of contract.  In a
capitalistic system, as long as a contract is based upon mutual consent,
harsh or one-sided bargains should be strictly enforced as a product of
private autonomy.
Nonetheless, most legal systems are uneasy in enforcing contracts that
are a product of overreaching, often due to severe bargaining power and
informational asymmetries.  In the eighteenth century, the law of contracts
was still anchored in the value of the fairness of the exchange.97  Thus, the
consideration to be exchanged had to be both legally sufficient (something
of value) and adequate (relatively of equal value).  In equity law, the princi-
ple of equitable unconscionability protected the importance of adequacy in
the exchange.98  By the end of the nineteenth century, the equitable holdo-
ver of adequacy of consideration was eradicated from the law of contracts.
Thus, as long as there was some consideration— even a “peppercorn” is
91. See Transamerica Life Inc. v. ING Canada Inc. (2003), 68 O.R. 3d 457, 468 (Can.
Ont. C.A.).  Canadian law has since moved further in the direction of recognizing a duty
of good faith. See Bhasin v. Hrynew, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 494, 498 (Can.).
92. See Bobux Marketing Ltd v. Raynor Marketing Ltd. [2001] 1 NZLR 506 (CA) at
[41] (N.Z.).
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
94. See Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good
Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1964).
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
96. James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587, 1599 (1981).
97. See LARRY A. DIMATTEO, EQUITABLE LAW OF CONTRACTS: STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES
44– 45 (2001).
98. Professor Mallor notes that: “unconscionability originated in courts of equity
primarily as a defense to specific performance.”  Jane P. Mallor, Unconscionability in
Contracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw. L.J. 1065, 1065 n.3 (1986); see Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447– 48 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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legally sufficient consideration99— the courts had a negative obligation not
to assess the relative value of the consideration being exchanged.  Lon
Fuller recognized this fundamental shift in his 1941 seminal article Consid-
eration and Form.100  In this article, Fuller asserts that consideration no
longer should be construed as a substantive law doctrine, but only served
as a formality, much like the Statute of Frauds’ requirement that some
types of contracts need to be in written form.  Interestingly, Karl Llewellyn,
highly influenced by German law,101 reinserted the concept of unconscio-
nability into contract law, not as an equitable principle, but as a doctrine of
sales law in writing Article 2 of the American UCC.102  However, English
law continues to reject a formal doctrine of unconscionability though the
term unconscionable is commonly seen in English court decisions.103
Under § 2-615 of the UCC, the doctrine of unconscionability applies
to both business and consumer contracts, but is not heavily used in prac-
tice.  It has rarely been used to save businesses from one-sided, uncon-
scionable contracts.104  Its main use has been voiding specific terms in
consumer contracts— such as cross-collateral security clauses in rental
agreements105 and forum choice clauses, where the agreed upon venue is
deemed to be inconvenient or prohibitively costly for the consumer to
bring an action.106  In these cases, a specific clause may be deemed uncon-
scionable, but not the entire contract.  American courts have not recog-
nized that substantively unfair, highly one-sided consumer contracts from
a valuation perspective to be unconscionable.107  In contrast, German law
allows termination of contracts for a change of circumstances (hardship)
and imbalances in contractual equilibrium.
99. See Chappell & Co. v. Nestle Co. [1960] AC 87 (HL) 1 [11] (appeal taken from
Eng.) (“Peppercorn does not cease to be good consideration if it is established that the
promisee does not like pepper and will throw away the corn.”). See also Edmund
Polubinski, Jr., The Peppercorn Theory and the Restatement of Contracts, 10 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 201 (1968) (discussing the peppercorn theory and nominal consideration).
100. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
101. See James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewel-
lyn’s German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156, 171 (1987).
102. See U.C.C. § 2-615 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013).
103. See, e.g., Cavendish Square Holding BV v. El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 [687]
(appeal taken from Eng.).  Lord Mance used this terminology in discussing penalty
clauses: “[T]he ultimate question as being whether the shipbuilders had shown that the
clause was exorbitant, extravagant or unconscionable. . . .” Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
104. See Mallor, supra note 98, at 1088 (“The danger is that courts will withhold the R
doctrine from deserving commercial parties.”).
105. See Williams, 350 F.2d at 447.
106. See Magno v. College Network, Inc., 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 829, 832 (Cal. Ct. App.
2016) (holding an arbitration clause as a forum selection clause to be unconscionable);
Julie H. Bruch, Forum Selection Clauses in Consumer Contracts: An Unconscionable Thing
Happened on the Way to the Forum, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 329, 349 (1992).  Some states
have enacted statutes voiding certain forum selection clauses in consumer cases. See,
e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 272.001 (stating a forum selection clause in a home
repair contract selecting another state is invalid).
107. See Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An
Empirical Analysis of Law in Action, 33 FL. ST. L. REV. 1067, 1110 (2006) (providing an
empirical analysis where claims of unconscionability the courts focus on consent factors
and not on substantive unfairness).
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The importance of freedom of contract is found in a number of the
general principles.  Article 3 espouses that personal and property rights
“are protected by the law; no organisation or individual may infringe upon
such rights and interests.”  The notions of individual free will and private
autonomy are found in the phrase “equal status,” used in a number of the
general principles.108  Freedom of contract and its basis in mutual consent
is made clear in Article 5’s phrase stating, “civil activities shall follow the
principles of voluntariness” and that engaging in civil activities, such as
entering or terminating a contract, would be recognized “according to the
[parties] own intentions.”  This view of civil relations based upon volun-
tary consent is re-emphasized in more specific provisions of the General
Rules,109 which will be discussed below.
The remaining principles place constraints on the absoluteness of free-
dom of contract.  They can be viewed both from the perspectives of Con-
fucian-socialist values and Western legal norms.  Communitarian and
fairness norms are found in all legal systems— the differences are a matter
of degree rather than kind.  Article 6 requires contracting parties to “follow
the principles of fairness in reasonably determining the rights and obliga-
tions of all parties concerned,” while Article 7 recognizes that each party
“shall follow the principles of good faith, adhere to honesty and keep their
commitments.”
The customary nature of Chinese law is evidenced in Article 8’s
requirement that civil activities shall not “go against the public order and
good customs.”  Article 10 again notes that when the rule of law fails to
resolve a dispute then “usual practice may be followed, but the public order
and good customs shall not be infringed upon.”  Finally, a new principle is
introduced in the General Rules, not found in the CCL or the earlier con-
tract laws.  Article 9 states that it is the duty of all legal persons to conduct
business in a way that protects the environment.  The communal harm
caused by China’s rapid industrialization is now recognized as a core con-
cern of Chinese society.110
C. Specific Provisions
The two areas selected for additional coverage in the General Rules are
those of legal capacity and intention to enter into legal obligations.
1. Capacity
The above general principles also need to be read in relation to the
articles on capacity and consent.  One uniquely Chinese or Eastern value
reflected in the area of capacity is the “legal” duty of children to tend to the
needs of incapacitated parents.  Article 26 in the “Guardianship” section
108. See, e.g., General Rules, supra note 7, at art. 2 (“[l]egal persons and
nonincorporated organisations as subjects with equal status”); id. at art. 4 (“[a]ll civil
subjects have equal status in civil activities”).
109. See generally id. at Section 2 on “Expressions of Intention.”
110. See id. at art. 9 (“[a]ny civil activity conducted by civil subjects shall be condu-
cive to saving resources and protecting the ecological environment”).
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states that: “Adult offspring have the obligation to provide for, support and
[protect] their parents.”  The root of this obligation can be seen in numer-
ous sources, including the Confucian virtues of respect for the role of par-
ents and the importance of preserving family relationships; socialist values
see the family as the core unit of a collective; economic need, exacerbated
by China’s one-child policy;111 and the lack of sufficient government fund-
ing of elderly care.
The age of contracting capacity is multi-faceted.  The general rule rec-
ognizes eighteen as the age of majority,112 giving persons full capacity to
enter into contracts, as it is in most Western legal systems.  However, the
General Rules provide more nuanced ancillary rules that expand capacity
unlike what is the norm in the West.  Article 18 of the General Rules pro-
vides that a minor over sixteen years old has “full capacity” when his or her
main source of income comes from a job.  This is an expansion of the com-
mon law’s necessity and emancipation doctrines that allow a minor, who
has left the care of his or her parents, to obtain implied in fact capacity in
order to make a livelihood.  In contrast, Article 18 gives full capacity to
enter into any and all contracts, even those unrelated to necessities or mak-
ing a livelihood.113
Finally, an expansive form of capacity is found in Article 19 of the
General Rules, which provides limited capacity to a minor as young as
eight: “[S]uch minor may independently perform any civil juristic act that
has a nature of pure profit or the performance of which is compatible with
his/her age and intelligence.”  This contextual determination of capacity
for someone so young is not seen in Western legal systems.114  The core
concept is the minor has “independent” capacity.
2. Expression of Intention
The General Rules devotes an entire section to the expression of inten-
tion.  First, it offers a specific rule for contracting by electronic means.
Thus, an offer or an acceptance is effective when it enters the receiving
party’s electronic system (e-mail; voice message), and not when the receiv-
ing party learns of its existence or opens the message.115  This is the con-
111. See Christine Chan, et al., The Demographic Consequences of China’s One-Child
Policy, INT’L ECON. DEV. PROG. UNI. MICH. 1, 3, 6 (2006) (explaining that the one-child
policy limited many Chinese couples to one-child. This was aimed at limiting population
growth but had the unintended demographic consequence of leading to the aging of the
population.).
112. See General Rules, supra note 7, at art. 17.
113. In the common law, the necessities doctrine provides capacity to minors in con-
tracts for necessities, traditionally defined as food, shelter, and clothing.  The emancipa-
tion doctrine can be seen as an expansion of the necessities doctrine when the minor is
self-supporting (such as entering contracts to run a business); id. at art. 18.
114. There are exceptions in Western laws, for example the case of child entertainers
to grant capacity to minors through guardianship or court order; see N.Y. Lab. L. § 186-
3.1, 12 N.Y.C.C.R. 186 (2013) (guardian of minor must obtain Temporary Child Per-
former Permit from the Office of the Commissioner of Labor).
115. See General Rules, supra note 7, at art. 137.
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sensus view in most formal laws that deal with the issue.116  The rationale
is that parties that do business through electronic means have a duty to
monitor their electronic systems for incoming messages.  Article 139 uses
the vague term “announcement” as an expression of intention,117 possibly
allowing for a broad interpretation of general advertisements as legal offers
and not just invitations to offer.
The General Rules provide a broad contextual approach to the interpre-
tation of expressions of intent (contracts).  Article 142 provides that the
meaning of words shall be determined based upon “the use of the words, in
combination with the relevant terms, the nature and purpose of the con-
duct, the habits and the principle of good faith” in order “to determine the
genuine meaning of the persons of the civil conduct.”118  Article 151 pro-
vides that “if one party uses the state of danger or lack of judgment of the
other party resulting in the unfairness in the establishment of the civil
juristic acts” that other party may apply to a court or arbitration associa-
tion to revoke the contract.119  The remedies for breach of contract found
in General Rules Article 179 include: “eliminate the impact or restore the
reputation” and “apologise.”120  The importance of status and reputation
embedded in Confucian values is at work here— a proper apology or a res-
toration of reputation being recognized as independent remedies than that
of mere payment of damages.
The socialist history of China is seen in Article 185, which allows for
civil liability against any person who infringes on the “reputation and hon-
our of heroic martyrs and public interests are damaged.”121  It is through
such provisions that the Communist Party acts as the gatekeeper to the
past.  In Article 185, the Party guards its legitimacy through provisions that
provide civil liability against anyone infringing on the reputation and
honor of martyrs.  History is itself a source of political legitimacy in China
and as such has long been contested politically.  Robert Bickers states that:
“We cannot understand the resurgence of China now, and its sometimes
quiet, sometimes raucous and foul-mouthed anger at the world, unless we
understand the traumatic century which followed the first opium war. . . .
For mere history matters in modern China, and the past is unfinished busi-
ness.”122  Finally, Article 186 provides that in breach of contract cases a
116. See UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT. § 15(b)(1), U.L.A. 44 (1999) (“electronic
record is received when: it enters an information processing system that the recipient has
designated or uses for the purpose of receiving electronic records”); UNIF. COMPUTER
INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 214(A), U.L.A. 102 (1999) (“[r]eceipt of an electronic message
is effective when received even if no individual is aware of its receipt”).
117. General Rules, supra note 7, at art. 139 (“[t]he expression of intention made in
the form of an announcement shall enter into force at the time of issue of the
announcement”).
118. Id. at art. 142.
119. Id. at art. 151.
120. Id. at art. 179.
121. Id. at art. 185.
122. ROBERT BICKERS, THE SCRAMBLE FOR CHINA 10 (2011). See also FRANK DIKO¨TTER,
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 319 (2016) (discussing the Party’s July 1981 resolution on
its own history, and the Party’s need to protect its legitimacy through official acts); see
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party may sue in contract or tort.123
In the end, one characteristic of the General Rules, as well as the CCL,
is the vagueness of many of its provisions including the general principles
and more specific provisions.124  Vagueness in law, especially contract law,
can be beneficial in providing flexibility for courts to handle novel cases
and to render justice, when strict rule application would cause an injustice:
[V]agueness in the law gives judges the power and latitude to construe laws
in ways that serve the public interest.  The Chinese courts seem to work
more like courts of equity and try to ultimately deliver fairness.  The inher-
ent problem with vagueness is that it leads to inconsistency and may serve
as a vehicle for corruption.125
As intimated in the above quote, the negative consequence associated with
vague principles or standards, as opposed to fixed rules, is uncertainty in
law application.  This is why common law systems generally expunge prin-
ciples of fairness from their contract law.  The rationale being that busi-
nesses’ distaste uncertainty and prefer hard and fast rules that are clear
and applied uniformly.126
D. Comparing the General Principles of CCL with the General Rules
The General Rules and CCL possess a mix of principles that from the
perspectives of the civil, and especially the common law, seem confusing
and conflictive, with the potential danger of diminishing the certainty and
predictability of contract law.  The general principles of the CCL can be
divided into two different groups based on their primary functions, namely
“private autonomy” and “public regulation.”  While private autonomy— the
right of private parties to create their own law through contract— is funda-
mental in the Western and Chinese contract law systems, judicial activism
or intervention is more likely in the Chinese courts.  This is, as explained
extensively above, due to cultural norms.  The CCL as applied seems to
subject contracting parties to greater judicial control:
also Roderick MacFarquhar, The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, in 15 CAM-
BRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA 305 (Roderick MacFarquhar & John K. Fairbank eds., 1991)
(same); c.f. HONG LIU, THE CHINESE STRATEGIC MIND 135– 40 (2015) (history is a key
strategic asset in Chinese political culture).
123. See General Rules, supra note 7, at art. 186 (“[i]f the personal rights and prop-
erty rights of one party have been infringed due to the breach of contract of the other
party, the injured party has the right to choose to claim liability for breach of contract or
tort liability”).
124. See Michele Lee, Franchising in China: Legal Challenges When First Entering the
Chinese Market, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 949, 980– 81 (2004) (“One notable characteristic
of Chinese laws is the vagueness inherent in the wording.”).
125. Matheson, supra note 42, at 378. R
126. Businesses prefer certainty and predictability in the law, and such predictability
tends to promote macroeconomic efficiency. See, e.g., Justin W. Evans & Anthony L.
Gabel, Legal Competitive Advantage and Legal Entrepreneurship: A Preliminary Interna-
tional Framework, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 333, 349– 56 (2014) (discussing
numerous authorities advancing this view and related ideas including, inter alia, the
Normative Coase Theorem).
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Although both systems use comparable labels that set limits to the operation
of freedom of contract, there is a clear difference in how widely or restric-
tively these are applied.  English common law generally has a very restrictive
approach, and courts are reluctant to interfere in the bargain reached
between the parties.127
The CCL includes comparable restrictions to those of the General
Rules but are more broadly restrictive in some instances.  Exhibit 2 com-
pares the general principles of the CCL with those of the General Rules.
Comparative Analysis of General Principles
General Rules of the Civil Law 2017Chinese Contract Law 1999
“maintaining social and economic order “maintaining social and economic orders,
and promoting socialist modernisation” adapting to the requirements of the
(Article 1) development of socialism with Chinese
characteristics, and carrying forward
socialist core values”
(Article 1)
“contract, as referred to in this law, is an “civil laws adjust personal relationships
agreement whereby natural persons, legal and property relationships between
persons or other organisations, as equal natural persons, legal persons and
parties” nonincorporated organisations as subjects
(Article 2) with equal status”
(Article 2)
“contracting parties are equal in their “All civil subjects have equal status in
legal status, and no party may impose civil activities.”
his own will upon the other party” (Article 4)
(Article 3)
“parties enjoy, according to law, the right “civil subjects engaging in civil activities
to voluntarily conclude contracts” shall follow the principles of
(Article 4) voluntariness”
(Article 5)
“parties shall observe the principle of “shall follow the principles of fairness in
fairness” determining reasonably the rights and
(Article 5) obligations of all parties concerned”
(Article 6)
“parties shall observe the principle of “shall follow the principles of good faith,
good faith in the exercise of their rights adhere to honesty and keep their
and performance of their duties” commitments”
(Article 6) (Article 7)
“respect public morals, and they shall not “civil activities may [not] violate laws or
disturb the social and economic order or go against the public order and good
harm the public interest” customs”
(Article 7) (Article 8)
“any civil dispute shall be resolved in
accordance with the law . . . but the
public order and good customs shall not
be infringed upon”
(Article 10)
127. See Christian Twigg-Flesner, General Principles of Chinese Contract Law: An
English Common Law Perspective, in CHINESE CONTRACT LAW: CIVIL AND COMMON LAW
PERSPECTIVES 44, 70 (DiMatteo & Chen eds., 2018).
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No CounterpartContracts concluded according to law are
legally binding on the parties.
(Article 8)
“Adult offspring have the obligation to
No Counterpart provide for, support and protect their
Parents.”
(Article 26)
“Any civil activity conducted by civil
No Counterpart subjects shall be conducive to saving
resources and protecting the ecological
environment.”
(Article 9)
“All civil activities within the territory of
No Counterpart the People’s Republic of China shall be
governed by the laws of the People’s
Republic of China.”
(Article 12)
First, it should be noted that freedom of contract does not appear in either
the CCL or the General Rules.  The issue of incorporating the language of
freedom of contract was highly debated during the drafting process.128
Instead, the concept of voluntariness is used in Article 4 of the CCL and
Article 5 of the General Rules.  This was primarily due to the fear that using
the word “freedom” would have political consequences.  Also, there existed
a fear of abuse of freedom of contract by a party to a contract.129  However,
in most Chinese commentaries, voluntariness is equated to freedom of
contract and is now a commonly accepted principle of its contract law with
limitations based upon Chinese characteristics.130  An example of cultural
spillover in the law is the emphasis placed in Chinese law on the mediation
of disputes.  “People’s mediation is a Chinese way of resolving
contradictions and settling disputes without resorting to legal
proceedings.”131  Mediation is seen as playing an “important role in
preventing and reducing civil disputes, resolving social conflicts, and
maintaining social harmony and stability.”132  The problem is that
Chinese courts have been known to pressure parties into protracted
periods of mediation in order to avoid making a decision on the merits.133
Article 3 of the CCL is problematic since it broadly states that, “no
party may impose his own will upon the other party.”  In the hard
negotiations of the free market, a battle of wills is often the means of
128. See Mo Zhang, Freedom of Contract with Chinese Legal Characteristics: A Closer
Look at China’s New Contract Law, 14 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 237, 243– 44 (2000).
129. Id. at 244.
130. Id. at 244– 46.
131. INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, CHINA, The Socialist System of Laws
with Chinese Characteristics (2011), http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/
09/09/content_281474986284659.htm [https://perma.cc/P8Q8-CQK5].
132. EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Full Text: The Socialist System of
Laws with Chinese Characteristics (12) (2011), http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/
zgyw/t871785.htm [https://perma.cc/BX28-F8C5].
133. See Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011)
(discussing the practice of Chinese courts in pressuring parties to mediate).
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obtaining the most efficient contract.  Thus, if this provision is broadly
construed it could inhibit the free bargaining needed to create efficient
markets.  If, however, the imposition of will merely refers to cases of duress
or fraud, then the phrase does not pose such a threat.  Since the CCL
contains specific provisions dealing with duress, fraud, and exploitation,
the idea of overcoming a party’s will may simply be a reflection of these
common policing doctrines.
The most troublesome of the principles from a free market perspective
is the fairness principle found in Article 5 of the CCL and Article 6 of the
General Rules.  The idea of a counterpoise to freedom of contract based
upon contractual imbalance is an old concept.  In English common law,
the equitable principle of unconscionability allowed the equity courts to
withhold equitable remedies based upon the unfairness of the contract.
German law has recognized hardship, in which a contract that was fair
upon conclusion becomes imbalanced subsequently due to a change of
circumstances.  In American law, the doctrine of unconscionability is a
principle of law.  But, in most cases, Western law requires something much
more than simple one-sidedness to intervene, especially in commercial
contracts.  In fact, the doctrine of unconscionability in Article 2 of the
American Uniform Commercial Code legally applies to consumer and
commercial sale of goods, but in practice is rarely ever used to police one-
sided commercial contracts.  Thus, the CCL’s mandate that the parties
follow the principle of fairness and the General Rules call for courts to
“follow the principles of fairness in determining reasonably the rights and
obligations of all parties” provides an avenue for the courts to abuse their
discretion in intervening in merely one-sided contracts.  Fortunately, as
will be seen in the later discussion of the principle of good faith, the courts
often use the principles of fairness and good faith in tandem.  This
indicates that the courts will require something more than simple one-
sidedness before they overturn the express terms of a contract.
III. Modern Contract Law with “Chinese Characteristics”
The concept of law with “Chinese characteristics” will be explored to
provide insight on how the Western-style CCL and General Rules may be
interpreted and applied by Chinese courts.  These laws will be placed in the
cultural context of Chinese society, including the role of Confucian values,
socialistic principles instilled since the Communist revolution of 1949, and
the notion of Chinese characteristics as espoused by the State and the
Communist Party.134  An analysis of the purposes and importance of gen-
134. Non-formal customary practices still influence how contracts are viewed as a
private-ordering instrument in China. See, e.g., Zhigang Shou, Xu (Vivian) Zheng &
Wenting Zhu, Contract Ineffectiveness in Emerging Markets: An Institutional Theory Per-
spective, 46 J. OPER. MGMT. 38 (2016) (recognizing custom and cultural values on the
effectiveness of contract law from the perspective of institutional theory); see, e.g.,
Baofeng Huo, Dijia Fu, Xiande Zhao & Jingwen Zhu, Curbing Opportunism in Logistics
Outsourcing Relationships: The Role of Relational Norms and Contract, 182 INT’L J. PROD.
ECON. 293 (2016).
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eral principles within a legal system will be offered.  Finally, a section is
devoted to the assertion that the principle of good faith acts as a meta-
principle in Chinese contract law.  The duty of good faith is a Western
concept, especially in civil law systems, imported into Chinese law.  It is
this principle and its application that reflect the true meaning of law with
Chinese characteristics.  The notion of good faith contracting is closely
aligned with the Confucian concept of virtue and the communitarian per-
spective of socialism.  The result of these influences is a broader role of
good faith in Chinese law than is found in Western law.
Chinese contract law can be considered a mixed-jurisdiction-type of
law in a number of ways.  First, the drafters of the modern contract laws—
CCL and expectantly in the drafting of a new civil code— have borrowed
from the legal systems of the civil and common laws.  In the rules of both
Chinese and Scots contract law, one sees the mark of the civilian and the
common law traditions.  In civilian terms, one finds in the CCL the princi-
ple of good faith (Article 6, and elsewhere), the exceptio non adimpleti con-
tractus (Articles 66– 69), culpa in contrahendo (Articles 42– 43), third party
rights (Article 64), and the actio pauliana (Articles 74– 75), among others,
and one does not find any requirement of consideration in order to validate
a contract.  In common law terms, the CCL has rules on anticipatory
breach (Article 94(2)), material breach (Article 94(4)), and foreseeability of
loss as a limitation on recoverable damages (Article 113).
Second, the influence of the predecessor communist-socialist system
of law persists.135  The communitarian-collective themes attendant to
socialistic systems is found in the general principles of the CCL and the
new General Rules.  Third, China has a long history of non-formal custom-
ary law that still plays a role in business practice as well as how contracts
are viewed as a private ordering instrument.  Confucian norms also deter
resorting to the court system as a method of resolving contract disputes.
Instead, compromise, negotiations, and informal mediation have been the
longstanding means of resolving disputes.136  This type of resolution is
done within the context of the parties’ relationship, informal third-party
persuasion, and the fear of negative reputational effects.137  In this type of
135. See Fu, see supra note 41.
136. See Jerome A. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL. L.
REV. 1201, 1201 (1966).
137. Cohen notes even during the Ching Dynasty, where local magistrates were given
the authority to rule on local disputes, that “the law in action provided a more accurate
index of the Chinese predisposition to compromise.” Id. at 1210.  There are patches of
such extra-legal, extra-judicial customary law systems in more formal rule of law coun-
tries.  These types of social or self-help systems are generally trade-related. See Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992) (exploring how diamond traders use extra-
contractual relations to enforce promises); see Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in
the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation, through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1724– 25 (2001) (associations— one representing mill owners and
another representing cotton merchants— have colluded to create a private resolution sys-
tem within the cotton industry where reputational effects is a major persuasive force in
resolving disputes).
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extra-legal system, the party that has been injured is often persuaded to
“give way”— that is, not to enforce contract rights with the hope that it can
recoup its losses in future dealings.138  Thus, relational and social norms
play an out-sized role in the negotiation, performance, and enforcement of
contracts than is the case in Western legal systems.  The normative context
in which business operates in China continues to be influenced by tradi-
tional values represented by Confucianism and socialist principles.
A. Confucian Values and Norms
Confucianism has dominated Chinese culture for millennia.  It is an
anti-individualistic ideology that view relationships and collective values to
be more important than individual freedom.139  A concrete example of the
influence of Confucian values and socialistic principles on Chinese con-
tract law is the expansive use by the courts of the principle of good faith.
The use of good faith comports with traditional values of the common
good and mutually beneficial relationships as opposed to the more individ-
ualistic nature of American contract law, where enforcing the parties’ con-
tract as written is deemed to be the courts’ primary role.  In contrast,
Chinese courts have been more willing to intervene in a contract that they
deem as being “immoral” (unfair).140
Confucianism values morality based upon respect of social status and
relational norms over formal law.141  One commentator associates the Chi-
nese view of good faith to the linkage of good faith to the duty of care in
fiduciary duties law.142  Thus, the parties, under the good faith principle,
owe a duty of care to one another and to society.  As a result, courts may
see the strict enforcement of a particular contract as antithetical to the Chi-
nese cultural view of good faith.  Thus, the principle of good faith through
the lens of Chinese culture is as much a moral principal as it is a legal one.
The principle of good faith helps to maintain China’s traditional mores and
commercial ethics.  By embracing the principle of good faith, the Chinese
courts are aligning the principle with China’s traditional morality, which is
also consistent with the norms of international commercial practice.  With
its strong moral force, the principle of good faith can be expected to con-
tribute much to the establishment of a normative transactional order in
China.143
138. Cohen phrases it as follows: “Moral [persons] did not insist on their ‘rights’ or
on the exclusive correctness of their own position, but settled a dispute through mutual
concessions that permitted each to save face.”  Cohen, supra note 136, at 1207– 08. R
139. See Chunlin Leonhard, A Legal Chameleon: An Examination of the Doctrine of
Good Faith in Chinese and American Contract Law, 25 CONN. J. INT’L L. 305, 324 (2010).
140. Id. at 326.
141. As one commentator has noted, “From the Confucian perspective, law is consid-
ered secondary and supplementary.” Id.  Thus, Confucian values and traditions con-
tinue to influence how the Chinese view contracts. See MING-JER CHEN, INSIDE CHINESE
BUSINESS: A GUIDE FOR MANAGERS WORLDWIDE 143 (2001) (discussing how Chinese soci-
ety traditionally viewed formal written contracts as unnecessary and an insult to the
reputations and integrity of the parties).
142. See Leonhard, supra note 139, at 326. R
143. Wang & Xu, supra note 44, at 13. R
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Wang and Xu provide a framework for understanding the duties
implied under the principle of good faith.  In the area of contract negotia-
tions, it requires a duty of loyalty in forming contracts, a duty of honesty
and non-deception, a duty to keep promises, and a duty of confidential-
ity.144  After formation of the contract, parties have a good faith duty to
diligently prepare for performance.145  During the performance phase, a
number of ancillary duties are linked to good faith performance including:
a duty of loyalty, a duty to disclose defects, a duty to notify of change in
circumstances that may impact performance, a duty to cooperate, and a
duty to provide instructions.146  At the termination of the contract, the par-
ties have a duty to give advanced notice, especially in cases of long-term
contracts, the duty not to terminate unless a delay or defect in performance
amounts to a frustration of the purpose of the contract, and the duty to not
terminate a contract if defects in an installment “comprise but an insignifi-
cant part of the entire order.”147  Good faith also requires the honoring of
the post-contractual duties of confidentiality and loyalty.
Finally, the principle of good faith also plays a major role in the inter-
pretation of contracts.  It essentially dictates a contextual approach to inter-
pretation where courts are expected to consider “the nature and purpose of
the contract, the business customs at the location of the contract’s forma-
tion, and so on, so as to arrive at the parties’ true intention and meaning”
and “balance the parties’ interests and determine the terms of the contract
fairly and reasonably.”148  Unfortunately, in the broader sense, the contex-
tual approach in Chinese law may refer to a context that is unrelated to the
particular parties and their contracts.  This broader contextual approach is
based on extralegal considerations such as advancing the mandates of the
Communist Party and the policies of the Chinese government.
Confucianism’s worldview is that each person has a certain role to
play in the creation of a harmonious society and that personal relation-
ships, or guanxi, remain a key feature of Chinese society.149 Guanxi sug-
gests that relationships include mutual obligation, reciprocity, and
goodwill.  This type of view sees contracts as minor reflections of a con-
tractual relationship— instead of seeing breach of contract as triggering a
legal right, it sees breach or “adjustment” of the contract as triggering a
moral right; “Once guanxi is established between two people, each can ask
a favor of the other with the expectation that the debt incurred will be
repaid sometime in the future.”150  Thus, Westerners negotiating contracts
144. Id. at 17– 19.
145. Id. at 18.
146. Id. at 20.
147. Id. at 20– 21.
148. Id. at 22.
149. See Robert Bejesky, Investing in the Dragon: Managing the Patent Versus Trade
Secret Protection Decision for the Multinational Corporation in China, 11 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 437, 473– 74 (2004).
150. MAYFAIR MEI-HUI YANG, GIFTS, FAVORS AND BANQUETS: THE ART OF SOCIAL RELA-
TIONSHIPS IN CHINA 1 (1994).  This view of the contractual relationship as being much
more than the formal written contract is captured in Ian Macneil’s relational theory of
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in China should be aware of how constructs like guanxi impact the Chinese
view of the lesser role of formal contracts compared to the importance of
the relationship in drafting the contract, and the normalcy of requests for
subsequent changes to the contract.151
Guanxi is just one example that shows the lack of importance of for-
mal law in the long history of China:
The concept and doctrines of legality, unlike the precepts of Confucianism,
have never occupied a central role in traditional imperial China.  There has
not existed a legal culture, with elements like officials fidelity to law or citi-
zens’ consciousness of their legal rights that provides the necessary condi-
tions for the effective operation of a modern, Western-style legal system.152
Stanley Lubman has noted that the relationship between informal,
normative concepts like guanxi, are not necessarily adversarial in nature to
the drafting of formal contracts or to formal legal rules.  In fact, he argues
that they may be complimentary in nature.153  Formal contracts and con-
tract rules serve the primary functions that they do elsewhere in the world:
they provide a framework for economic relationships, a blueprint of the
parties’ obligations, and allow parties to plan for the future.  The difference
is between the formal view of written contracts as static instruments and
the sanctity of contractual rights (Western view), versus the view that for-
mal contracts are starting points meant to be flexible and subject to adjust-
ment.154  Thus, where a Western party sees a Chinese request to re-
negotiate terms in the contract as an act of bad faith, the Chinese party
sees it as a natural phenomenon of cooperation and mutual interests
embedded in the business relationship.155
There is evidence, however, that the introduction of formal contract
law has begun to loosen the grip of cultural norms on contract relation-
ships.  The rise of commercial and contract litigation in Chinese courts
demonstrates that business and ordinary persons now see the law and liti-
gation as a means of protecting their interests.156  The rise of contract liti-
contracts, in which cooperation, re-negotiation, and solidarity are primary norms. See
generally IAN R. MACNEIL, RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY: SELECTED WORKS (2001); Ian R.
Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclas-
sical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978).
151. The concept of guanxi networking, which includes a heightened loyalty to imme-
diate family, affects the business and contract climate in ways Westerners do not expect.
It creates an aversion to conflict and litigation.  This changes the structure of negotia-
tions; post-ratification changes are expected and encouraged if it helps avoid a breach
and results in a fulfilled contract. See Matheson, supra note 42, at 374– 75 (citing Patri- R
cia Pattison & Daniel Herron, The Mountains Are High and the Emperor is Far Away:
Sanctity of Contract Law in China, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 488 (2003)).
152. ALBERT HY CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUB-
LIC OF CHINA 116 (3d ed. 2004).
153. Lubman, supra note 5, at 73– 74. R
154. “Although Westerners view contract formation (signing) as the culmination of
the process, this is just the beginning of the process for the Chinese.”  Matheson, supra
note 42, at 382. R
155. See Lubman, supra note 5, at 73. R
156. See generally Timothy Lau et al., Note, Protecting Trademark Rights in China
through Litigation, 47 STAN. J INT’L L. 441 (2011) (arguing that litigation may be a pro-
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gation also shows that even though contracting relationships remain
influenced by cultural norms and customary law, the institution of formal
contract law has expanded the level of impersonal contracting and has
undercut the influence of extra-contractual practices and cultural norms
on economic relationships.157
B. Communism and Socialistic Principles
Between 1958 and 1978, the Chinese economic system was based on a
planned economic model with all allocation decisions made by govern-
ment authorities: “The rights and obligations of the parties and dispute
resolution arising in these contractual exchanges were, to a large extent,
based on custom and relations.  There did not exist a comprehensive con-
tract law system, or any formal application of contract law.”158  Commu-
nist ideology and socialist principles reinforced the collectivist values of
Confucianism.  Under the latter, social roles and values were more impor-
tant than individual interests.  The former did not recognize private owner-
ship of property, and therefore had little use for private contract law.  In
essence, all property was owned by the State, and in all contracts, at least
one of the parties was the State.
The remnants of a primitive, functional legal system, which also
lingered in the domain of contract law, was destroyed during the era of the
Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976.159  In 1978, the Communist Party
led by Deng Xiaoping made a radical change in policy, implementing a
transition from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy.160  As
reliance on the centrally-controlled economy began to wane, the impor-
tance of private contractual exchanges increased, leading to the need for a
more formal contract law.  But such a law needed to be in sync with a
quasi-capitalistic, quasi-socialistic market economy.  Thus, the focus
needed to move away from the common good and public interest model of
exchange based upon Confucian and communistic-socialistic principles, to
one focused on economic self-interest and private autonomy.  Therefore,
the notion of freedom of contract in which private parties determine the
ductive means to protect one’s trademark rights in China). See also Benjamin L. Lieb-
man, Legal Aid and Public Interest Law in China, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 211, 282 (1999)
(acknowledging that while the wide-scale protection of individuals is still uncertain,
“China’s experience with both legal aid and class action litigation demonstrates that, in
many cases, governmental policy goals may be consistent with expanding access to the
legal system and the vindication of individual rights”).
157. See Lucie Cheng & Arthur Rosett, Contract with a Chinese Face: Socially Embed-
ded Factors in the Transformation from Hierachy to Market, 1978– 1989, 5 J. CHINESE L.
143, 243 (1991) (“The availability of impersonal contract law institutions provides a
competitive alternative to, and therefore potentially undercuts, the networks of informal
connections.”).
158. Zhong Jianhua & Yu Guanghua, China’s Uniform Contract Law: Progress and
Problems, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 3 (1999).
159. See Wang Chenguang, Introduction: An Emerging Legal System, in INTRODUCTION
TO CHINESE LAW 1, 5– 7 (Wang Chenguang & Zhang Xianchu eds., 1997); JONATHAN D.
SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 704– 05 (1990); YUHUA WANG, TYING THE AUTO-
CRAT’S HANDS 51 (2015).
160. See Chenguang, supra note 159, at 4.
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content of their contracts without government interference, was made the
guiding principle in the drafting of the CCL.  However, as explained below,
the meaning of “freedom” and “without government interference” was not
known or well understood in Chinese law and culture.  In reality, espe-
cially in the beginning of the free contract era, government interference
into private ordering remained commonplace.
Despite the importance of implementing freedom of contract as core
principle, the CCL included numerous general principles that limit or
police the exercise of freedom of contract.  The CCL further incorporated
numerous and exceedingly vague provisions stating that free contract was
“subject to” other government laws, policies, and authorities.  Such provi-
sions are found in CCL Articles 10, 38, 44, 77, 126, 129, 132, 133, 137,
142, and 150.  Furthermore, the CCL voids contracts in cases where there
are negative third-party externalities on the interests of private parties, the
public, or the state.161  “Although China has moved towards a rule of law
system, public policy [as stated by the government and government agen-
cies or interpreted by the courts] still plays an important role.”162  None-
theless, the recognition of freedom of contract as a fundamental principle
of contract law served an important first step in the development of a sepa-
rate private law regime in China:
Although China has moved to a market economy, administrative institutions
still have the inclination to interfere with enterprises, particularly state-
owned enterprises, in their business decisions.  The freedom of contract pro-
vision provides legal means to resist such intervention.163
Despite the cultivation of a private ordering system, communism, as
represented by the Communist Party, continues to influence Chinese cul-
ture with its emphasis on the common good and the importance of main-
taining relationships and obedience to superiors in the governmental and
societal hierarchy.164
The outsized power of Chinese local governments is a major challenge
for the maintenance of rule of law and certainty in application of the law,
as they often interpret the law to advance local needs and sometimes pro-
tect local corruption at the expense of enforcing national law and regula-
tions.  Despite the rhetoric of rule of law and equality before the law, the
reality is that courts are not viewed as superior to state agencies: “In the
bureaucratic hierarchy, courts are only parallel to, rather than superior to,
other units of the Chinese bureaucracy.  When courts seek to enforce judg-
ments, agencies whose actions are required to assist the courts sometimes
refuse to cooperate.”165  This legal localism is reinforced by the fact that
161. See CCL, supra note 20, at art. 52 (1), (2).
162. Matheson, supra note 42, at 380. R
163. Jianhua & Guanghua, supra note 158, at 9. R
164. See Pattison & Herron, supra note 151, at 486. See also, Teema Ruskola, Law R
Without Law, Or is “Chinese Law” an Oxymoron?, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 655,
659– 60 (2003) (Chinese society based upon obedience to superiors).
165. Lubman, supra note 5, at 29.  The influence of government and state agencies in R
judicial proceedings illustrates that the courts are not considered as independent, but as
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local judges are hired and paid by the local government and Communist
Party apparatus.
C. Contract Law with ‘Chinese Characteristics’
As discussed above, social practices and cultural norms stemming
from the long-history of extra-legal mechanisms for dealing with business
relationships, influenced by Confucian and socialistic values, has been
vital in the creation of modern contract law.  Putting it in more concrete
terms, the meaning of legal terms, such as good faith, must be understood
not from the Western perspective, but rather from the context of Con-
fucian-socialistic norms.  Good faith is a powerful example; its use and
application quickly became a robust part of Chinese contract law because
it is a core value of Confucian thought.166  Thus, these “embedded struc-
tures” (traditions, customs, principles) shaped the understanding of West-
ern legal concepts by the drafters of Chinese contract law, and despite the
similarity of terminology between Chinese and Western contract law, these
embedded structures continue to guide interpretation and application of
Chinese contract law.  The same can also be said of embedded structures
of the law of equity, which continue to influence the application of com-
mon law.167
Article 1 of the General Rules states one of its purposes as the advance-
ment of a private law that “adapt[s] to the requirements of the development
of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and carrying forward socialist
core values.”  Again, what does the notion of law with Chinese characteris-
tics mean?  At its most abstract level, this notion aims to blend Eastern and
Western cultural and business values.  Chinese cultural values are repre-
sented by customary law, which has evolved over many centuries, as
briefly discussed in the previous section’s review of the Confucian value
system.  More recently, the 1949 transition to Communism began the
enculturation of Chinese society with communist-socialist principles
including the ideas of complete subservience to the state and collectivism.
Some of these principles had long been embedded within the Chinese cul-
a quasi-state agency.  This is partly due to constitutional shortcomings and the dictato-
rial rule of Imperial and then Communist China.  Thus, “separation of powers is not a
concept put to use in the Chinese government.”  Matheson, supra note 42, at 376.  In his R
review of the CCL upon its adoption in 1999, James Hitchingham stated that the “gov-
ernmental agencies continue to regulate contractual relations [and] newly borrowed
contract standards are still undefined. . . .  Consequently, in the near term, contracting
parties may continue to find contractual justice elusive.”  James Hitchingham, Stepping
up to the Needs of the International Marketplace: An Analysis of the 1999 Uniform Contract
Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 28– 29 (2000)
(citing Daniel Rubenstein, Legal and Institutional Uncertainties in the Domestic Contract
Law of the People’s Republic of China, 42 MCGILL L.J. 495, 495– 97 (1997)).
166. “A practice’s compatibility with familiar social patterns is a factor that will influ-
ence the ease of its adoption and use.”  Cheng & Rosett, supra note 157, at 151.
167. See T. Leigh Anenson, Studies in Equity: The Fusion of Unclean Hands in
America 7 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Cornell International Law Jour-
nal); Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law Theory: Transforming Embedded
Influences into a Fuller Understanding of Modern Contract Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 839,
840 (1999).
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tural belief, stemming from the ancient imperial and feudal systems.
Socialism reinforced some of these longstanding values, as well as empha-
sizing new variations of these communitarian norms.
In 2015, the Chinese State Council issued a document entitled “The
Socialist System of Laws with Chinese Characteristics (Socialist System of
Laws).”168  This type of instrument seems out of touch and is surprisingly
late considering the fact that it has been more than three decades since
China opened up its markets to international trade and sought transition
to a market economy.  The foreword of the document states: “We need to
bring into being a socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics so
as to ensure there are laws to abide by for the carrying on of state affairs
and social life.”169  It is important to note that the document is not refer-
ring to socialism as an appendage to Communism, but as something that
relates to “social democracy.”  But, how can such a term be reconciled with
the dictatorial nature of the system, where there is dictatorship by consen-
sus among members of the ruling elite, and at times a dictatorship of one
(Mao & Xi Jinping)?
The document refers to amendments made to the Chinese Constitu-
tion in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004.  The Constitution now states that the
state “practices a socialist market economy,” “exercises the rule of law,
building a socialist country governed according to law,” and “respects and
protects human rights,” that “citizens’ lawful private property is inviola-
ble,” and that “the system of multi-party cooperation and political consulta-
tion led by the Communist Party of China will exist and develop in China
for a long time to come.”170  The crucial question remaining is what the
meaning of creating a “socialist market economy” is in Chinese culture and
law.  One answer can be seen in the Socialist System of Laws’ description
of the role of the Constitution:
China’s Constitution defines the basic system and basic tasks of the state.  It
affirms the leadership of the CPC, establishes the guiding role of Marxism-
Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important
thought of the ‘Three Represents,’ which determines the state system as a
people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the
alliance of workers and peasants.  It also takes the system of people’s con-
gresses as the form of administration.171
This understanding of the dominance of the Chinese Communist
Party explains the inherent conflict caused by intermeshing autocracy and
free market, and public and private property.  For example, despite the
General Rules’ recognition of private property, the spirit behind the law is
that such property should be used to advance social interests.  Private par-
ties cannot own fee title in real estate but can “buy” real estate based upon
168. INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, supra note 131 (earlier version
issued October 2011).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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long-term leases of 50 to 70 years.172  Another facet of the Chinese market
system, as noted earlier, is the decentralized nature of government regula-
tion where local governments are given substantial power to regulate busi-
nesses “in the light of the specific local conditions and actual needs.”173
Another example of a convergence of long held cultural norms and
modern contract law is the Chinese concept of heli or reasonableness,
which is a major feature of the common law and is especially robust in
Article 2 of the American Uniform Commercial Code.  The CCL makes
numerous references to reasonableness,174 but again the cultural meaning
of heli influences the application of such a standard.  Thus, it is important
to note that the concept of heli is much more textured then that of mere
reasonableness.  In Chinese culture, reasonableness or heli is linked with
notions of fairness or justice.175  This linkage has two major conse-
quences.  First, Chinese courts, much like arbitral panels,176 balance the
interests of the parties, as well as society and the State, to render fair and
equitable decisions.  Thus, Chinese courts avoid the strict enforcement of
contract rights and contract law rules.  Second, such a view of contracts
requires a broad contextual approach to contract interpretation including
taking into account the background relationship of the parties, the circum-
stances relating to the formation and performance of the contract, and cus-
tomary practices in a trade or business.  Professor Timoteo explains that
judges bring a tripartite framework in the interpretation of law and con-
tracts: heqing (feelings, relationship, and circumstances), heli (reason), and
hefa (legal rules).  Thus, courts are placed in the position of striking a bal-
ance between “relationship, rightness, and law.”177  Timoteo argues that
these factors have had an important impact on the creation of operative
rules in the Chinese courts.178
Despite no formal adoption by the CCL, heli paved the way for the
Chinese courts’ recognition of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus or change
172. See YILIN HOU, QIANG REN & PING ZHANG, THE PROPERTY TAX IN CHINA 29 (2015).
173. INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, supra note 131.  It should be noted
that China is a diverse country that includes 155 ethnic autonomous areas, 5 autono-
mous regions, 30 autonomous prefectures, and 120 autonomous counties. See id.
174. See e.g., CCL arts.: 23 ¶ 2 (reasonable time), 39 (reasonable manner), 69 (rea-
sonable time), 74 (unreasonably low), 94 ¶ 3 (reasonable time), 95 (reasonable time),
110 ¶ 3 (reasonable time), 111 (choose reasonably), 118 (reasonable time), 119 (reason-
able expenses), 158 (reasonable time), and 426 (determined reasonably).
175. The li in heli translates into reason or reasonable and “it was used in strict con-
nection with the concept of yi, a term that is generally translated as justice or righteous-
ness.”  Marina Timoteo, Vague Notions in Chinese Contract Law: The Case of Heli, 18 EUR
REV. PRIV. L. 939, 942 (2010).
176. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Soft Law and the Principle of Fair and Equitable Decision
Making in International Contract Arbitration, 1 CHINESE COMP. J.L. 221, 253 (2013).
177. Timoteo, supra note 175, at 943. R
178. See Timoteo, supra note 175, at 943.  There is a strain of literature on the differ-
ence between the “formal rules” and “operative rules” of law.  The latter being the actual
application of the former. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Formal and Operative Rules
under the Common Law and Code, 30 UCLA L. REV. 898 (1983); see also Ann Morales
Olaza´bal, Formal and Operative Rules in Overliquidation Per Se Cases, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 503
(2004).
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of circumstances in the enforcement of contracts.179  The SPC recognized,
in a Guiding Opinion180 and a Judicial Interpretation,181 the doctrine of
change of circumstances and the idea of contractual adjustment.  The SPC
indicates in its guidance that the parties should renegotiate an adjustment
of the contract when there is a material change of circumstances and the
courts should act to mediate an adjustment if the parties fail to reach agree-
ment.182  Article 26 of the Interpretation provides that if a material change
in circumstances occurs after the formation of a contract, which would
render continued performance of the contract manifestly unfair, the court
can amend or terminate the contract.
At present, the best that can be said is that China in a short period of
time has created a formal legal system and a great body of substantive law;
however, it still has a long way to go to be considered as a country gov-
erned by the rule of law, at least in the Western sense.183  Clearly, it has
never been the goal of the Chinese government or Communist Party to
evolve China into a liberal democracy based on Western standards.184  The
creation of a modern legal system has served a more instrumental goal of
stimulating economic development and wealth creation, but also to main-
tain the unquestioned power of the government (Party) as the core source
of law.  In this sense the adoption of Western-style law and the recognition
of freedom of contract as an important private ordering instrument has
been a key to China’s economic growth.
Despite the introduction of the rule of law through the adoption of
Western-style substantive law, the impartial, objective, and well-reasoned
judicial application of the law has not been a hallmark of the Chinese court
system.  Important governmental (bureaucracy), Party, and local non-gov-
ernmental power structures (organizations, rural collectives) continue to
influence judicial decision making.  As one scholar has noted, the Commu-
nist Party is the “ghost hidden in the legal machine.”185  For most courts if
there is a perceived conflict between government policy (national, regional,
local) and formal law they will most often ignore the law and side with
179. See Timoteo, supra note 175, at 944. R
180. Guiding Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning
Trial of Cases on Disputes over Civil and Commercial Contracts in the Current Situation
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. July 7, 2009, effective July 7, 2009).
181. See generally Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shiyong “Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Hetongfa” Ruo Gan Wenti de Jieshi [Interpretation of the Supreme People’s
Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the Contract Law of the People’s
Republic of China (II)] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. Apr. 24, 2009, effective
May 13, 2009).
182. See Timoteo, supra note 175 at 949. R
183. “There is a substantial difference from a normative perspective between the mere
existence of a legal system and establishing the rule of law.”  Orts, supra note 1, at 47.
184. See, e.g., Charles Burton, China’s Post-Mao Transition: The Role of the Party and
Ideology in the “New Period”, 60 PACIFIC AFFAIRS 431, 431 (1987) (explaining the overrid-
ing purpose of post-Mao reforms “is to preserve the status quo of party rule”); EDWARD
TSE, THE CHINA STRATEGY 92 (2010) (“For Deng and his successors, maintaining the rule
of the [CCP] has been the sine qua non of their agenda.”).
185. Orts, Rule of Law, supra note 1, at 67. R
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policy objectives.186
Just as the vague general principles found in the CCL and the General
Rules, and other borrowed Western legal concepts, the rule of law is an
empty vessel to be defined in the unique context of Chinese culture, values,
and power structures.  The next section will revisit the role of general prin-
ciples and the example of the good faith principle in the framing of a con-
tract law with Chinese characteristics.
D. Purpose of General Principles
The CCL enumerates several important principles and places them at
the very beginning of the instrument to show their importance in under-
standing and interpreting the CCL.  These articles, distinguished from
legal rules, are treated as general or “fundamental.”187  The general princi-
ples can be used in a number of ways.  First, the principles are used to
interpret and apply the more specific rules found in the law.  Secondly,
general principles may be used to prevent injustice due to the strict applica-
tion of specific contract law rules.188  Thirdly, the general principles can
be used to interpret and fill in gaps of a contract.  Fourthly, general princi-
ples can be used to police contracts and monitor the improper conduct of
the contracting parties.  An example of the second and third use of general
principles is the Chinese Supreme Court’s recognition of change of circum-
stances (hardship).  There is no express provision in the CCL on parties’
obligation to re-negotiate a contract that has become a burden on one of
the parties due to an unforeseeable change of circumstances.  The SPC fil-
led the gap in its “Interpretation of the SPC on Certain Issues Concerning
the Application of the Contract Law of the PRC (II).”189  Article 26 reads as
follows:
When after the conclusion of a contract there is a grave change of objective
circumstances, which is not foreseeable by the parties at the time of the
conclusion of the contract, and which is not caused by a force majeure and
which should not be classified as commercial risks, to continue to perform
the contract will be obviously unfair for one party or will not achieve the
purpose of the contract, the party requests the people’s court to modify or
terminate the contract, the people’s court shall determine whether to modify
186. See Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 755
(1994).  Placing it in the context of the rule of law, a scholar in 1994 stated: “[T]he use
of Party policy documents to provide the necessary context for legal interpretation.
These doctrines have also sustained the view that law derives its coherence of meaning
more from its political and social context than from a reasoned interpretation of statu-
tory language.” Id.  In the following two decades this is still largely the case.  But, ongo-
ing improvements in legal education and the training of judges has improved the legal
reasoning skills of the judiciary leading to better reasoned legal decisions based on the
rule of law, at least in the relatively mundane, apolitical nature of most contract
disputes.
187. Shiyuan Han, General Principles of the CCL, in CHINESE CONTRACT LAW: CIVIL AND
COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVES 29, 29 (DiMatteo & Chen eds., 2018).
188. See id. at 7.
189. See generally Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues
Concerning the Application of the Contract Law, supra note 181.
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or terminate it or not, according to the principle of fairness, and taking the
real situations of the case into consideration (emphasis added).
The use of a general principle to supplant a specific rule in order to avoid
an unjust result is a controversial concept.  In fact, the mainstream view is
that specific rules supplant any application of a general principle.  The pur-
pose of specific, fixed rules is to provide certainty to the law of contract.
At times, a given dispute raises the issue of how to resolve the applica-
tion of conflicting principles.  One such case is Xinyu Co. Ltd. v. Feng
Yumei,190 which involved a shopping center owner’s attempt to terminate a
contract of sale.  After the owner sold shopping space to the defendant, the
owner decided to change the theme of the complex and proceeded to buy
back the nearly 150 spaces that it sold.  The defendant was one of two
parties that held out.  The complex owner brought an action requesting a
termination of the contract.  The court held in favor of the complex owner,
even though it was the breaching party.  The court held that under the
principles of fairness191 and good faith,192 the defendant-purchaser
should have cooperated by selling back the shop space given the change in
the theme of the complex.  Despite the fundamental principles of freedom
of contract and pacta sunt servanda (sanctity of the contract),193 the court
believed it was for the greater good to terminate the contract.  Such a deci-
sion would be considered absurd in most other legal systems.
Professor Shiyuan Han explains the rationale for the decision based
upon Chinese cultural traits: “In China, it is generally acceptable to put
social public interest before personal interest.”194  He further notes that
Chinese judges tend to follow a “result-oriented” method of legal reasoning:
“Chinese judges consider not only legal effects (falu¨ xiaoguo) of the judg-
ments, but also their social effects (shehui xiaoguo).”195
The idea of placing Chinese normative values inside of a Western-style
body of law is explored below using the example of the principle of good
faith.  Put simply, the duty of good faith has more substantive sweep under
Chinese values than it does under Western-style law, including the German
law’s embrace of good faith as a core private ordering instrument.
E. Good Faith as Meta-Principle?
This section examines the scope of the duty of good faith as culturally
dependent, as well as its expansive use in Chinese legal context and prac-
tice popularly referred to as the “King clause.”
190. Xinyu gongsi su Feng Yu Mei shangpu maimai hetong jiufen [Xinyu Company v.
Feng Yumei Retail Business Contract Dispute], 1999 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 37, 37-38
(Sup. People’s Ct. 2006) (China).
191. See CCL, supra note 20, at art. 5.
192. See id. at art. 6.
193. See id. at art. 107.
194. Han, supra note 187, at 11. R
195. Id. at 12.
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1. Good Faith as Cultural Dependent Principle
In all legal systems, civil, common, and mixed jurisdictions, the free-
dom of contract principle is the core foundation of contract law.  But due
to bargaining power and informational asymmetries, there is the threat that
freedom of contract, if left unchecked, will lead to abuse (unconscionable
or illegal contracts).  Therefore, there needs to be a countervailing principle
that can be used to police contractual misconduct, overreaching, and
abuse.  There are numerous more tailored doctrines or principles used to
police specific kinds of abuse— “abuse of rights” in French law (enforce-
ment of contract rights); culpa in contrahendo in civil law (pre-contractual
misconduct); “surprise terms” in German law (standard terms regulation);
duty to re-negotiate (change of circumstances); waiver and estoppel in the
common law; the penalty rule in the common law; and so forth.  But, the
general policing doctrine that best responds to abuse of freedom of con-
tract is the principle of good faith.  The duty of good faith is explicitly or
implicitly found in most national and international contract laws.196
Although it is important to note that English law, one of the more popular
choices of law in international contracts, does not expressly recognize a
general duty of good faith, it often reaches similar outcomes by other
means, such as through contract interpretation and implied terms.197
Finally, the principle of good faith has a strong influence in international
commercial arbitration.198
The good faith provision in the German Civil Code199 has had a per-
vasive impact on the enforcement and interpretation of contracts, and the
196. See Alexander S. Komarov, Internationality, Uniformity and Observance of Good
Faith as Criteria in Interpretation of CISG: Some Remarks on Article 7(1), 25 J.L. & COM.
75, 82 (2005); see generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
under the UNIDROIT Principles, Relevant Conventions and National Laws, 3 TUL. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 47 (1995).
197. The mainstream opinion is that the United Kingdom is an outlier in the area of
good faith.  It is true that UK courts have soundly rejected such a duty.  But, in reality,
bad faith contracts have been policed in more covert ways under English law leading to
similar outcomes that result in countries that have expressly adopted a general duty of
good faith in all contracts. See ELISABETH PEDEN, GOOD FAITH IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
CONTRACTS 11 (2003) (noting that the duty of good faith “is slowly being introduced
into England through European and international initiatives”); Elena Christine Zaccaria,
The Dilemma of Good Faith in International Commercial Trade, 1 MACQUARIE J. BUS. L.
101, 103 (2004) (noting that English law takes a different “route” to reach results
arrived at in civil law, without recurring to good faith).  More recently, a UK court has
recognized that good faith can be an implied in fact term in a contract in certain circum-
stances. See Yam Seng Pte Ltd., supra note 89, at para. 131.  It is also important to note
that other common law countries, such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, have
adopted the duty of good faith. See generally Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd, supra
note 90 (setting forth a requirement of reasonableness); Bhasin, supra note 91; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
198. See generally Bernardo M. Cremades, Salient Issues in International Commercial
Arbitration: Good Faith in International Arbitration, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 761 (2012).
199. See BU¨RGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], supra note 88, at § 241.
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application of contract law rules.200  One commentator explains that:
Paragraph 242 of the BGB has played an extremely important role in Ger-
man jurisprudence.  The judge or, as the case may be, the arbitrator, acts (a)
in exercising his function, to apply the law and, as appropriate, to specify
the consequences of what is established by law; (b) to limit the exercise of
contractual rights where there may be an excess in the abusive exercise of
the right; and (c) even contra legem, to impose himself in the form of a true
ethical-legal rupture of the legal right.  Hence, the German trier of fact has
learned how to use the letter of paragraph 242 in a radically different man-
ner depending on the ethical-political demands of the time.  The German
jurist has introduced, together with the principal obligations of any contract,
so-called accessory obligations.  These include, for example, the duty of vigi-
lance, the obligation of clarification to the other party, loyalty, the obligation
to cooperate, and the obligation to inform.201
Good faith clearly acts as a meta-principle in German law in which most
issues of contracts are seen through its prism.  At the opposite end of the
spectrum is English law’s rejection of the good faith principle; English
law’s dislike of the principle is anchored in the view that such an abstract
limiting principle adds an unacceptable degree of uncertainty to contract
law and the enforcement of contracts.
2. Good Faith in the Chinese Cultural and Legal Context
The Chinese legal perspective of the good faith principle is aligned
with German law.  In fact, Chinese scholars refer to good faith as the “King
clause,” referring to the civil law use of the term “general clause” or to what
the common law would call a general principle.202  This is not surprising
due to the strong influence German law has had on Chinese law— histori-
cally it had an indirect influence through the Chinese study of the Japanese
Civil Code, which was based on the German Civil Code, and directly in the
drafting of China’s modern contract laws.203  Also, the good faith principle
aligns with Confucian thought and values.204  Along with its relationship
to traditional Chinese values, the principle of good faith has served func-
tional needs.  Because of the rapid rate of change in China (both economic
and legal), Chinese laws are often filled with numerous gaps in coverage.
200. See Werner F. Ebke & Bettina M. Steinhauer, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Ger-
man Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 171, 190 (Jack Beatson
& Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995).
201. Cremades, supra note 198, at 773– 74. R
202. Simona Novaretti, General Clauses and Practices: The Use of the Principle of Good
Faith in the Decisions of Chinese Courts, 18 EUR REV. PRIV. L. 953, 953, 968 (2010).
203. “The legal model chosen by Chinese reformers is the German system, filtered by
the Japanese experience.” Id. at 955 (referencing the drafting of the Chinese (Republi-
can) Civil Code of 1931).  Japan adopted the German Civil Code (Burgerliches
Gesetzbuch or BGB) in 1898.  Given the role of Confucianism in Japanese society, the
Japanese enactment of the German law created much interest, and subsequent study, in
China. See Keller, supra note 186, at 718.  This influence was demonstrated by the R
enactment of the “Six Codes” in the 1930s, which was essentially the Chinese govern-
ment’s “reception of the Romano-German civil law tradition.” Id.
204. See Leonhard, supra note 139, at 310 (“[T]he doctrine recognizes and enforces R
traditional Chinese notions of morality and business ethics.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-2\CIN203.txt unknown Seq: 41 11-OCT-18 13:53
2018 ‘Rule of Law’ in China 431
The good faith principle is often used as the gap-filler of choice.205
Similar to other civil law systems, good faith constitutes a fundamental
principle of Chinese civil and private law.206  The CCL recognizes a duty
of good faith in the negotiation, performance, and enforcement of con-
tracts.207  Chinese scholars have favored the use of the good faith principle
by the courts to fill in gaps in statutory law and the interpretation and
enforcement of contracts.208  Good faith’s importance lies in the fact that it
provides the judicial discretion needed to work out new law via the adjudi-
cation process.  Also, as noted previously, Chinese jurists have a built-in
affinity for good faith because of its civil law tradition, as well as its consis-
tency with Chinese cultural norms:
Good faith has not only been one of the general principles for people’s every-
day conduct but has also been a crucial moral precept in China’s commer-
cial practice.  By embracing the principle of good faith, the Contract Law is
recognizing China’s traditional morality and business ethics, which is also
consistent with the norms of international commercial practice.209
Professor Novaretti explains the malleability of the good faith term in Chi-
nese legal tradition due to its association with a basket of societal norms.
The good faith principle in Chinese culture captures the norms of “honesty
and credibility,” good intentions, trust, human virtue, integrity, benevo-
lence, solidarity, doing right, morality, loyalty, social justice, fairness, and
collective well-being.210
This normative set is the context upon which the principle of good
faith is applied.  The practical implication of this broad societal view of
good faith includes: (1) a greater likelihood of avoiding terms of contract in
favor of ethical standards and trade practice; (2) reliance on the broader
use of contextual evidence; (3) a greater likelihood of considering societal
and collective interests and policies of the State; (4) the promotion of con-
tractual justice or a fair balance in the contract;211 (5) the recognition of a
duty to re-negotiate contract terms to achieve fairness in cases where cir-
cumstances change; (6) a duty to disclose information;212 (7) a duty to
205. Id. at 311.
206. See Ewan McKendrick & Qiao Liu, Good Faith in Contract Performance in the
Chinese and Common Laws, in CHINESE CONTRACT LAW: CIVIL AND COMMON LAW PERSPEC-
TIVES 72, 72 (DiMatteo & Chen eds., 2018); see also General Principles of the Civil Law
of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by Order No. 37 of the President of the
People’s Republic of China Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 4, LAWINFOCHINA.
COM, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=2780
[https://perma.cc/4JT4-6N6N] (stating that civil activities shall observe the principles
of voluntariness, fairness, equality in price and remuneration, and good faith).
207. See CCL, supra note 20.
208. See, e.g., Liang Huixing, Good Faith Principle and Gap-filling, 2 CHINESE J.L.
 22, 23, 25 (1994).
209. Wang & Xu, supra note 44, at 16. R
210. See Novaretti, supra note 202, at 954, 956, 958, 960 & 962.
211. Id. at 965– 67.
212. The duty to disclose information may refer to the disclosure of materials facts
related to the contract and in some cases a duty to disclose alternatives or other available
options. See People’s Court of Xiling district, city of Yichang (Hubei), Case 4972004,
available at www.chinacourt.org/ajdq (posted April 5, 2007).
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perform additional duties not formally specified in the contract;213 and (8)
the promotion of mediation for contract disputes.  Due to the importance
placed on collective interests, societal norms, and cultural values, in some
instances, the contract can be viewed as a three-party contract: party-to-
party and parties-to-society; in an informal way, society can be seen as
having third-party rights or being third-party beneficiaries.214  Exhibit 1
shows the use of good faith and associated principles throughout the CCL
and the General Rules.
Exhibit 1
Duty of Good Faith in Chinese Law
Value Article Article
CCL General Concrete Application
Rules
Good Faith 6 7 In the exercise of their rights and performance of
(core) their duties; Adhere to honesty and keep their
commitments
Fairness 5 6 In determining their respective rights and duties;
In determining reasonably the rights and
obligations of all parties concerned.
Bad Faith 42 Negotiates in bad faith under the pretext of
Negotiation concluding a contract; intentionally conceals a
material fact; other acts that violate the principle
of good faith;215 liability under preliminary
agreements216
Public Interest 52 Conceals an illegal purpose in a lawful form;
violates the public interest
Malfeasance to 59 Harm the interests of the state, a collective
Third Parties organisation or a third person
213. See Novaretti, supra note 202, at 972– 75.
214. See id. at 963 (“The principle of good faith as expressed by the General Princi-
ples of Civil Law, therefore, is not merely aimed at regulating the relationship among the
parties to an agreement but, rather, seeks to weigh the interests of the subjects involved
in the legal relationship in question against the interests of the state and society.”).
215. The SPC expanded the reach of Article 42 (3) (“engages in other acts that violate
the principle of good faith”) into the area of conditional contracts.  So if one party is
obligated to register or obtain a government approval “fails to complete such procedures
[related to registration or obtaining an approval], such party shall be deemed to have
committed ‘any other act in violation of the principle of good faith’ specified in Item (3)
of Article 42 of the CCL.” See generally Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on
Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the Contract Law, supra note 181 at art. 1.
216. The SPC broadened the duty of good faith negotiations to include preliminary
agreements, stating that: “if one party does not perform the obligation of concluding a
sales contract and the other party requests that it assume liability for breach of the
preliminary agreements or demands the rescission of the preliminary agreements and
claims compensation for damages.”  Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on
Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Cases of Disputes over Sales
and Purchase Contracts (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. Mar. 31, 2012, effective
July 1, 2012), art. 2.
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60 Observe the principle of good faith and performCooperation,
such duties as giving notice, providing assistanceNotice,
and maintaining confidentiality in accordance withConfidentiality
the nature and purpose of the contract as well as
the usage of transaction
Post- 92 After contractual rights and obligations are
Contractual discharged, the parties shall observe the principle
Obligations of good faith and perform such duties as giving
notice, providing assistance and maintaining
confidentiality in accordance with the usage of
transaction
Contract 125 142 In light of the words and expressions used in the
Interpretation contract, the related terms in the contract, the
purpose of the contract, the usage of transaction
and the principle of good faith; the use of the
words, in combination with the relevant terms, the
nature and purpose of the conduct, the habits and
the principle of good faith shall not be restricted
by the used words and sentences, the relevant
clauses, the nature and purpose of the conduct,
the habits and the principle of good faith shall be
considered in combination to determine the
genuine meaning of the persons of the civil
conduct217
Setting a 74 Debtor transfers his property at a price that clearly
Reasonable is unreasonably low218
Price relating
to debtor
Standard Terms 39– 40 Comply with the principle of fairness when
Regulation determining the rights and duties of the parties,
shall, in a reasonable manner, draw the attention
of the other party to the terms which exclude or
limit his liability and term is void if it increases
the liability of the other party or deprives the other
party of a major right219
217. The role of good faith in contract interpretation is re-emphasized in the
Interpretation on Contract Law II, Article 1.  The SPC states that a valid contract only
needs to provide the name of the parties, subject matter, and the amount, and the court
will imply the remaining terms through Articles 61, 62 and 125 of the CCL (principle of
good faith).
218. Interpretation on Contract Law II, Article 19 clarifies that an unreasonable low
price is one that is 70% lower than the market price.
219. Interpretation on Contract Law II, Article 6 clarifies the Article 39 (CCL)
obligation of the party supplying the standard terms to bring them to the attention of
the other party in a “reasonable manner.”  It states that: “[T]he party providing the
standard clauses, at the time of conclusion, adopts the word, symbol, character style or
other special marks that are sufficient to invite the other party’s attention to the
exemptible and restrictive clause regarding its liability and render explanations of such
clauses upon the other party’s request, the people’s court shall determine that the
former party has ‘adopted the reasonable manner’ as specified in Article 39 of the CCL.”
Article 9 again recognizes that in the area of exemption from liability or exculpatory
clauses the supplier of the standard terms has the “obligation of reminder and
explanations.”  Failure to do so results in the voiding of the clauses.
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SPC Recognition by Supreme People’s Court220Change of
Circumstances
Reasonable 114 SPC If liquidated damages are excessively higher than
liquidated the loss incurred, the parties may apply to the
damages or people’s court or arbitral institution for an
penalties appropriate reduction221
Reasonable 158 SPC SPC Interpretation on Issues Concerning Disputes
time to give over Sales Contracts (effective July 1, 2012), Article
notice of non- 17 states that the court should determine a
conformity reasonable time for inspection of goods “based on
(defect) the principle of good faith”
Agency Restriction on the authority of the legal
61, 62, representative by the Articles of Association of the
170 legal person or the governing body of the legal
person shall not confront the counterparties in
good faith and limitation on the authority of
personnel who complete the tasks for the legal
persons or the non-incorporated organisations
shall not confront the counterparties in good faith.
Registration of If the actual situation of a legal person is
company or 65 inconsistent with the registered items, it shall not
organization confront the counterparty in good faith.
Improper Resolutions between the legal person and the
Company 85 counterparties in good faith shall not be affected.
Resolutions
Company A for-profit legal person who engages in business
governance 86 activities shall abide by business ethics, maintain
transaction security, accept government and social
supervision, and assume social responsibility.
Natural persons enjoy the right to life, physical
Civil rights 110, 132 rights, health rights, name rights, portrait rights,
reputation, right of honour, privacy, marriage
autonomy and other rights.
The civil subjects shall not abuse the civil rights
and damage the national interests, the social
public interests
Public order & 143(3), Civil juristic acts that violate public order and
social customs 153 social customs are invalid
3. Good Faith in Chinese Legal Practice
In practice, the actual application of the good faith principle has been
characterized by uncertainty.  First, good faith is often directly connected
with trade practice and in some parts of the CCL the principle of good
faith is used interchangeably with trade practice.  Article 60 provides that
220. Interpretation on Contract Law II, Article 26 (if an unforeseeable and significant
change of circumstances that are not ordinary “commercial risks, and to continue with
the performance of the contract will be obviously unfair to one concerned party or will
not realize the purpose for which such contract was concluded” then the court may
“modify or terminate the contract on the basis of the principles of fairness”).
221. Interpretation on Contract Law II, Article 29 specifies any reduction in the
amount of liquidated damages shall be “according to the principles of equity and good
faith.”  It further states that any liquidated damages amount that is 30% or more than
the actual damages incurred will be deemed to be excessively high.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-2\CIN203.txt unknown Seq: 45 11-OCT-18 13:53
2018 ‘Rule of Law’ in China 435
parties in the performance of their obligations shall perform such duties as
notification, assistance and confidentiality “in accordance with the nature
and purpose of the contract and trade practice.”  Article 92 states that good
faith performance duties after the termination of the contract shall be “in
accordance with trade practice.”
In the area of contract interpretation, Article 125 provides that the
meaning of a contract term should be based upon its wording, the purpose
of the contract, trade practice, and the principle of good faith.  A reference
to a self-standing requirement of good faith may even be qualified by its
context.  CCL Article 42 extends the good faith duty to the negotiations of
contracts, such as: (1) bad faith negotiation with no real intention to con-
tract; (2) deliberate concealment of material facts or the deliberate convey-
ing of misinformation; or (3) “other conduct in contravention of the
principle of good faith.”  The first examples are obvious cases of bad faith
conduct; thus, the question is how broad should the third example be con-
strued in the regulation of pre-contract activity?  It is unclear whether with-
drawal from an ongoing negotiation without a good reason or failure to
notify, assist, or protect the other party’s interests amounts to “other con-
duct in contravention of the principle of good faith.”222
Despite scholarly consensus in support of the use of the good faith
principle, there is no general agreement on its practical meaning.223  Good
faith translates from Chinese into “honesty, trustworthiness, and credita-
bility.”224  Nevertheless, the breadth of good faith has yet to be worked out
by Chinese scholars or judges.  Must a party disclose confidential informa-
tion during the negotiation of a contract?  How should the implied duty of
loyalty be defined and applied?  Since specific definitions often fail, Profes-
sor Liang suggests the following approach:
[A party is required to] respect the interests of the other party, attend to its
affairs with the same care used for one’s own affairs, ensuring that each
party to the legal relationship obtains its due share of benefit, and not to
benefit oneself at the cost of the other’ [and, additionally, not to] “harm the
interests of a third party or the society by one’s own conduct” [and to] “exer-
cise one’s right in a way congruent with its social-economic purposes.”225
222. McKendrick & Liu, supra note 206, at 77 (citing UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING R
THE SPC INTERPRETATION II ON CONTRACT LAW 73 (Shen Deyong, XI Xiaomin & SPC
Research Office eds., 2009)).
223. See id. (citing Xu Guodong, Two Notes on the Principle of Good Faith, 4 CHINESE
J.L. 74 (2002)).
224. Id. (citing Liu Xiangqian v Anbang Property Insurance Co, Suqian City (Jiangsu)
IPC, 2 Nov. 2011, SPC Gazette, 2013, vol. 8 (concealment by insurer of recoverability of
insurance compensation); China Everbright Group Co v Liquidator of Beijing Jinghua
Trust Investment Co and Beijing Gaodeng Ltd, SPC, 14 Mar. 2011, (2010) Min Ti Zi No.
87 (concealment by lender from guarantor of borrower’s unauthorised alteration of use
of the loan).
225. Liang, supra note 208 at 24 (citing SHI SHANGKUAN, GENERAL STUDIES ON THE LAW R
OF OBLIGATIONS (1978); GUODONG XU, INTERPRETING FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL
LAW 78 (1992) (discussing a common conclusion that can be drawn from other schol-
ars, that good faith principles are based on existing rules regarding fairness).
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This is a very abstract and broad view of good faith that is far beyond the
notion of good faith in the civil or common law systems.  It shows the con-
tinuing influence on some scholars of socialistic principles held over from
communism.  Professor Bing Ling offers a more modern and practical ver-
sion of the role of good faith as the standard of conduct accepted in a
community, such as “in the community in which the transaction takes
place,” which can be characterized as the demands of commercial
reasonableness.226
There is also confusion, despite the use of the good faith principle by
Chinese courts, regarding its actual importance in judicial reasoning.  For
example, good faith is often used unnecessarily in the application of spe-
cific rules articulated in the CCL.227  Professors McKendrick and Liu note
that “there exists a common practice amongst Chinese courts, particularly
courts at the lower level of the hierarchy, of blindly resorting to good faith
as an omnipotent solution irrespective of the availability of a direct and
specific solution to the dispute before the court.”228
McKendrick and Liu also note that it is common in Chinese judicial
decisions not to cite the good faith principle independently and of also
citing other general principles in the CCL, such as the principles of equal-
ity, voluntariness, and fairness.229  This shows that many judges do not
make a distinction between the general principles despite the fact that they
serve different normative values.  For example, parties may act in good
faith and still produce a one-sided or unfair contract.230  Nonetheless, the
courts have often used the principle of good faith to evaluate contracts in
the interest of fairness to the parties, influenced by concerns of public pol-
icy and morals.231
The Chinese courts’ recognition of an unlimited duty of good faith is
most likely due to cultural influences, such as socialist norms and Con-
fucian values, that have been discussed previously.232  These norms and
values focus on communal or societal interests and not on private auton-
omy.  This is seen in the continuation of rural collectives and public owner-
ship of real property.  In such a context, contracts and personal rights are
interests that are routinely subordinated to group rights and interests.  To
some extent, every contractual relationship is regarded as embedded in a
226. See BING LING, CONTRACT LAW IN CHINA 54 (2002).
227. See McKendrick & Liu, supra note 206, at 79 (citing Luo Yi, The Application of R
the Principle of Good Faith in Civil Judgments— An Empirical Survey of 53 Cases Reported in
the SPC Gazette, 11 J.L. APPLICATION 58 (2009)); Xiaoyi City Chenming Coal Char Ltd v.
Shanxi Province Gangyu Coal Char Ltd., SPC, 24 Dec. 2012, (2012) Min Er Zhong Zi
No. 104 (attempted termination of contract because output capacity did not match what
was agreed upon in the original contract; Supreme People’s Court held that termination
should not be permitted because ensuring a specific output capacity was not the core
reason for the parties contracting in the first place).
228. McKendrick & Liu, supra note 206, at 79– 80. R
229. See CCL, supra note 20, at arts. 3– 5..
230. See Matheson, supra note 42, at 351– 52.
231. See Yu Fei, Distinguishing between the Principle of Public Order and Morality and
That of Good Faith, 11 SOC. SCI. CHINA, 146, 161– 62 (2015).
232. See Pattison & Herron, supra note 151, at 488.
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deeper, wider societal relationship.  Consequently, the signing of a con-
tract as a symbol of its sanctity is downgraded to merely ‘the beginning’ of
the parties’ real business relationship.233  It is for this reason not objection-
able to raise, beyond the terms of a contract, an expectation that the parties
cooperate and help each other out when needed.  Equilibrium in the recip-
rocal exchange between the parties is accepted as an essential part of what
contractual justice comprises.
Coupled with a civil law tendency to resort to general clauses found in
civil codes,234 the above cultural factors have led to a reluctance or inability
of Chinese lawyers at times to separate law from morality and a corre-
sponding over-anxiousness in them to succumb to the influences of cul-
tural codes of ethics in spite of the direct applicability of fixed rules of law
or clear terms of contract.235  The antagonism between the principle of
good faith and that of freedom of contract has not gone unnoticed.  In
contrast to its Western counterpart, the modern Chinese law of contract
seems to have followed a path of evolution in the opposite direction.  While
the common law countries have moved in the direction of a wider accept-
ance of the implied duty of good faith, Chinese legal reasoning has become
more rigorous resulting in the diminishing of the over use of good faith as
the rationale for case decisions.
Since the establishment of the PRC, the notion of good faith gained a
foothold and acquired a wide reception in Chinese contract law.  The
notion was then gradually encroached upon as a result of the rise of free-
dom of contract.236  An accompanying development has been the disap-
pearance of cases in which a court relied solely upon such general
principles as that of good faith in reaching a decision.  Chinese courts are
now increasingly aware of the need to identify concrete rules of law appli-
cable to the dispute.  However, as noted earlier, there is still a widespread
judicial practice that the principle of good faith is invoked together with
other, more specific provisions of law, even when the specific provisions
deal directly with the issue at hand.
A decision of China’s premier international arbitration panel, China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), pro-
vides an example of what seems like a case of straight forward contract
interpretation to one in which the principle of good faith and reference to
customary practices are used to provide additional justificatory weight to
the arbitration panel’s decision.237  The case involved the sale and
purchase of space heaters from a German seller to a Chinese buyer.  The
233. Id. at 491.
234. See BASIL S. MARKESINIS, HANNES UNBERATH & ANGUS JOHNSTON, THE GERMAN LAW
OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE 641 (2006).
235. See, e.g., Wang Liming & Xu Chuanxi, Fundamental Principles of China’s Con-
tract Law, 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 16, 18, 19, 20– 21 (1999).
236. See Lou Jianbo & Liu Yan, ‘Limits to the Principle of Freedom of Contract and Its
Relationship with the Principle of Good Faith, 6 PEKING U. L.J. 35, 43 (1995).
237. Chinese Buyer v. German Seller (Heaters Case), CISG/2005/05, Arbitration
Award, CIETAC, China (2005), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/051207c1.html
[https://perma.cc/42P9-7W8M]. [hereinafter Heaters Case].
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obvious time of year to sell such heaters is during the winter season.  The
contract provided that the buyer could return any unsold units and receive
a full refund.  This ended up being the case.  The buyer sent notice to
seller’s agent of its intent to return a number of units.  The facts show that
the buyer delayed in giving notice until after the winter season had come to
an end and failed to provide the warehouse location where the seller could
take over the goods.  Nonetheless, the arbitral panel held in favor of the
buyer.
The panel recognized the CISG as the applicable law, but used provi-
sions in the CCL to render its decision considering the issues of the case to
be outside the scope of the CISG.  The panel began its opinion by unneces-
sarily confirming two general principles— “reflects the true minds of the
two parties and does not violate mandatory provisions of the laws and
administrational regulations of China.”238  Despite the application of spe-
cific provisions, the panel’s analysis essentially rested on whether the buyer
acted in bad faith by delaying notice and not providing sufficient content in
its notice or whether the seller acted inappropriately in not making prompt
arrangements to take back the goods.  The first issue concerned the calcu-
lation of the price of the heaters for purposes of setting the refund amount.
The court held that the parties had subjectively different interpretations on
the appropriate method of calculation.  The panel sided with the seller
using the reasonable person standard of CISG Article 8(2),239  “a reasona-
ble person of the same kind as the [Seller] would have understood the con-
tract price as the unit price of each model, but not the total contract price
as alleged by the [Buyer].”240
The panel then wrongfully disregarded the CISG interpretive method-
ology (interpretation through the general principles of the CISG) and,
instead, utilized provisions 60 to 62 of the CCL.  In the end, it didn’t matter
since the content of those provisions were the same general principles as
provided for in the CISG.  In regard to the appropriateness of the buyer’s
notice and the seller’s response, the panel referred to CCL Article 60: “The
parties shall fully perform their respective obligations in accordance with
the contract.  The parties shall abide by the principle of good faith, and
perform obligations such as notification, assistance, and confidentiality, in
light of the nature and purpose of the contract and in accordance with the
relevant usage.”241  The panel held that the listing of the goods to be
returned was sufficient notice since it allowed the seller enough informa-
tion to prepare for taking back the goods.242
238. Id.
239. Interpretation should provide a meaning “according to [the] intent where the
other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was” under CISG
Article 8(1).  If such meaning is not determinable then, under CISG Article 8(2), the
interpretation shall be “according to the understanding that a reasonable person of the
same kind as the other party would have had in the same circumstances.”
240. Heaters Case, supra note 237. R
241. See CCL, supra note 20, at art. 60.
242. The panel should have referred to CISG in determining the reasonableness of the
notice. See Heaters Case, supra note 237 (“[As to the] content of return notice, the Arbi-
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In regard to the setting of the refund price, the panel references Article
61 of the CCL: “[If an] agreement is unclear, the parties may agree upon
supplementary provisions to such terms through negotiation.  In the case
of a failure in doing so, the terms shall be determined from the context of
relevant clauses of the contract or by transaction usages.”  Finally, the
panel recognizes the civilian notion of purposive interpretation as noted in
Article 62 of the CCL: “[I]f the method of performance was not clearly
prescribed, performance shall be rendered in a manner which is conducive
to realizing the purpose of the contract.”  It is from these open-textured
rules (standards), the panel reasons that the buyer’s notice, although not
complete in content, was sufficient to trigger the seller’s obligation to take
back the goods.
The panel states that the first order rule is the parties’ mutual obliga-
tion to negotiate a resolution in good faith.  If a negotiation fails, then
recourse would be through analogical reasoning from other provisions in
the contract and then to applicable trade usage.  If this proves unsuccessful,
then “the performance shall be rendered in a manner which is conducive to
realizing the purpose of the contract.”243  The purpose of the contract was
for the seller to supply a sufficient number of heaters for the winter season
and allow the buyer to return the unsold units.  In the end, the court rea-
soned that the seller “violated the honest and good faith principle”244 since
it did not attempt to directly negotiate a return of the goods from the buyer,
instead using surrogates, and then failing to provide a “letter of entrust-
ment” requested by the buyer stating that the seller’s agents had the author-
ity to negotiate the return.  Finally, the seller’s demand that the refund be
made in Chinese currency (renminbi) instead of the currency stipulated in
the contract (euros) “set an unreasonable barrier to the return of the
goods.”245  As we can see from this case, the direct interpretation from the
provisions of the contract through specific CISG or CCL rules is aban-
doned in favor of general principles that are expressed or implied by the
relevant law— a reasonable person of the same kind; parties shall abide by
the principle of good faith; violate the honest and good faith principle;
realize the purpose of the contract; and an unreasonable barrier to the
return of the goods.
Interestingly, the principle of good faith worked in the seller’s favor on
the issue of liquidated damages.  The contract provided for one percent per
diem as liquidated damages.  Yet, the court found the per diem amount too
high and reduced the amount to ten percent per annum under Article 114
of the CCL,246 holding that a reduction to ten percent per annum was justi-
fied under principles of equality and reasonableness.247
tration Tribunal deems that as long as the models and quantity of the goods were clearly
indicated in a notice which would enable the [Seller] to make preparation to accept the
goods, the requirements for a reasonable return notice is fulfilled.”).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See CCL, supra note 20, at art. 114.
247. Heaters Case, supra note 237. R
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Professor Novaretti correctly observes that Chinese courts use the
principle of good faith to shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the
defendant.248  For instance, Professor Novaretti discusses a case where a
seller delivered a new refrigerator to replace a defective one, and the buyer
was unable to personally inspect the new refrigerator at the time of deliv-
ery.249  When the buyer noticed mold and other imperfections, the buyer
claimed that the seller had delivered a used refrigerator instead of a new
replacement.  Upon this claim, the court shifted the burden of proof from
the plaintiff (consumer) to the defendant (seller) to prove that the refrigera-
tor was new.  These instances, and other unjustified intrusions by courts
into the autonomy of contracting parties, will continue to occur and will
remain a real danger in China without legislation that spells out the bound-
aries of judicial discretion, a mechanism to guide a court’s reasoning in
applying specific rules in a timely way, or the hiring of a body of well-
trained judges.250
IV. The Paradigm of Hard-Soft Law
This part will use the analogy of hard-soft law found in international
law.  The CCL and future Civil Code represents hard law and cultural val-
ues act as soft law, used to interpret the hard law.  The second section
makes some recommendations as China advances toward a general civil
code.
A. Chinese Contract Law as a Hard and Soft Law System
In international private law, the concept of soft law or customary
international law251 plays an important role in the performance of con-
tracts and in the resolution of disputes.  Courts and arbitral tribunals will
at times look outside the applicable hard law, such as domestic contract
law or the CISG, to evidence of trade usage, business customs, and com-
mercial practice to interpret contracts and to determine whether there was
bad faith performance.  In other areas, such as international finance, soft
law takes the form of standards and principles.  At times, soft law can
trump hard law in instances where a court or arbitral tribunal recognizes
something as international customary law that preempts the application of
attributable domestic hard law (choice of law or conflicts of law).252  Such
248. See Novaretti, supra note 202, at 976– 78.
249. Id.  It is important to note that Chinese Civil Procedure Rules provided for such
a shift in the burden of proof.  Article 7 of the Regulations on Evidence in Civil Proceed-
ings, which the Supreme People’s Court issued on November 9, 2003, provides that, “In
the event that the present Regulations, existing provisions, and judicial interpretations
cannot be adapted to a given legal question in order to determine the burden of proof,
the People’s Court ought to base the determination on the principles of good faith and
fairness, as well as the parties’ evidentiary competence.”
250. See Lou & Liu, supra note 236, at 41. R
251. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Soft Law and the Principle of Fair and Equitable Decision
Making in International Contract Arbitration, 1 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 221, 221 (2013).
252. See, e.g., ICC Case No. 5873 of 1989 (holding that the panel would apply CISG
as evidence of international customary or soft law instead of Dutch law because Dutch
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a dichotomy is also at work in domestic legal systems.253  This is especially
true in China, which has a long history of informal customary law.
Indeed, in China’s case hard law (CCL, CISG, General Rules, administrative
regulations) is insufficient to truly understand the role of law in Chinese
society.
Another way to approach the topic of the interrelationship between
Chinese law and Chinese culture is to view hard law as theory and custom-
ary or soft law as practice.  China’s new modern, Western-style contract
laws provide hard rules that are intended to be the basis for parties to con-
tract.  However, this is presently more theoretical than real.  First, Chinese
cultural norms weigh in favor of mediation, compromise, and relationship-
preservation than it does to litigation.254  Second, rational judicial reason-
ing in the application of hard rules and principles is lacking in the Chinese
judiciary because of its lack of skill and familiarity with the Western legal
concepts found in the CCL.  The Chinese judiciary should improve, and
without improvement, there is a great deal of uncertainty because different
courts interpret and apply the same contract rules in different ways.
Third, the tradition of Chinese civil law does not harmonize well with
the CCL because unlike common law, case-by-case adjudications do not
occur— there is no reference to other court decisions.  Fourth, the impor-
tance of social roles and networks, the importance of the common good
and public interest, and the dominate role played by the Communist Party
and state agencies continue to influence or bias the judicial process.  In a
meaningful way, these norms and cultural tendencies are the soft law of the
Chinese legal system or “the law beyond the state.”255
In China’s case, cultural norms (Confucianism, guanxi, socialistic-
communal-collective ideals) are, in a sense, the law behind the law.  The
meaning attached to the hard rules of contract is heavily influenced by this
normative background, which one scholar has characterized as the “nor-
mative richness of life in China.”256  Cultural norms of the common good
(most often set by the State), fairness, and equity will continue to influence
the application of contract law and its remedies at the expense of a purely
law had an unusually short statute of limitations— six months— that was contrary to
international customary law while Article 39 of the CISG had a two-year limitation
period); Larry A. DiMatteo, Resolving International Contract Disputes, 53 DISP. RES. J. 75,
75– 79 (1998).
253. See Jessika van der Sluijs, Normative Legitimacy of Domestic Soft Law (Stockholm
Fac. L.  Research Paper Series, No. 7, 2017), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2951767 [https://perma.cc/VVK7-K5ZE] (discussing how soft
law is an important element in Swedish law).
254. Confucianism viewed litigation and formal arbitration disgracefully, instead
wanting parties to mediate their differences in order to maintain social harmony. See
Cohen, supra note 136, at 1206– 07. R
255. The idea of “law beyond the state” has a long history in the Chinese Confucian’s
view that arbitration and litigation force dispute resolution and disrupt social harmony.
Thus, the Confusion value of structure strongly supports the role of informal mediation
through negotiation, compromise, and third-party persuasion.  In this form of media-
tion, legal rules are all but irrelevant. See van der Sluijs, supra note 253. R
256. Keller, supra note 186, at 711. R
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objective application of formal rules.257
B. Towards a General Civil Code
This Article has emphasized how Chinese courts have applied in non-
conventional manners legal concepts, rules, and principles taken or bor-
rowed from Western law.  Vague principles, like good faith, fairness, and
reasonableness, reflect traditional Chinese values.  Thus, Chinese courts
have applied the principle of good faith in application, not to mimic West-
ern law, but rather to be consistent and coherent with Chinese cultural
values.  Thus, Western law and Chinese law, while containing the same
words, have diverged because Chinese courts interpret Chinese law within
the confines of Chinese cultural values and legal traditions.
The Western perspective that foreign legal systems “misuse” Western
legal concepts is a product of Western bias.  Because the West makes up
much of the developed world, it sees the evolution of legal systems based
on Western law, as is the case of China, as evidence of its superiority.
From this perspective, failing to understand Western law and its applica-
tion leads to uncertainty and inefficiency.258
This line of Western bias is misplaced.  Borrowing foreign law or legal
concepts does not require the interpretation and application of that law
and those concepts to be in complete harmony with where they originated.
Law is never a completely autonomous system because it works within and
is influenced by non-legal considerations of historical nuance and cultural
diversity.  At the same time, there are differences between good and bad
applications.  Indeed, the SPC in its issuance of “Interpretations”259 and
Guiding Opinions260 has recognized this fact, aiming to bring greater cer-
tainty and consistency in the application of Chinese contract law among
the various levels of the Chinese court system.
Nevertheless, the consequences of the above divergence between the
meaning of legal concepts in the borrowing country and the originating
country are numerous.  First, a Western business must understand how
the Chinese court system understands well-known legal concepts in pecu-
liarly Chinese ways.  Second, the Western businessperson should always
place the written contract into a relational mindset.  What a Western per-
spective might view as a fixed term with a clearly defined meaning might
be malleable in the face of Chinese cultural norms.  Third, the divergence
may recede as the Chinese judiciary becomes better trained and sophisti-
cated in the application of legal reasoning to render more objective deci-
257. See Glenn Morgan & Sigrid Quack, Law as a Governing Institution, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 275, 277, 300 (Glenn Mor-
gan et al. eds., 2010) (observing a recursion effect between context and law, that context
influences and changes law and law influences and changes context).
258. See Hendrik Zwarensteyn, Some Observations of the Comparison of Legal Institu-
tions and the Concepts of Law in Different Societies, 10 AM. BUS. L.J. 17, 20 (1972) (“[T]he
view that our approaches to foreign legal systems . . . are imperceptibly interwoven and
inter-connected by our underlying feelings of superiority of own system(s) . . . .”).
259. See text accompanying supra note 21. R
260. See text accompanying supra note 18. R
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sions.  Fourth, through continued use of SPC “Interpretations,” as well as
the full implementation of the Guiding Opinion system, divergent opinions
in regional and local courts when applying the CCL and the future Civil
Code will hopefully be worked out of the system, resulting in greater cer-
tainty and consistency in judicial outcomes.  Fifth, the Chinese govern-
ment should continue to improve its contract law.  The Civil Code Project
provides an opportunity to craft a third-generation contract law that should
remain a stable force for decades to come.  The CCL’s unification of the
different Chinese contract law regimes was a major step forward in the
unification and modernization of the law.  Notwithstanding its achieve-
ments, the almost two decades of its existence has illuminated its flaws,
those being redundancies, inconsistencies, and gaps.  Hopefully, China
will meticulously draft its new Civil Code to correct the imperfections of
the current CCL.
Conclusion
The movement to a third generation of modern Chinese contract law
has begun with the enactment of the introductory part of what is expected
to be a Chinese Civil Code.  The 2017 General Rules of the Civil Law of the
People’s Republic of China (General Rules) provides the framework for a full-
fledged Western-style civil code.  The focus of this Article is on the general
principles provided in the 1999 Chinese Contract Law (CCL) and the Gen-
eral Rules.  The comparison reveals that cultural norms, as espoused in
Confucian values, and socialistic principles, carried over from the era of
the Communist planned economy continue to influence Chinese civil law.
It is this normative structure and other extralegal influences, such as the
dominant roles played by the Communist Party and its policies, which dif-
ferentiate the Chinese view of the rule of law with its Western conception.
These cultural influences play a crucial role in the interpretation and
application of Western legal concepts embedded in modern Chinese con-
tract law.  Based on China’s Confucian-Socialistic value structure, which
focuses on the value of the collective over the individual and relational
structures over formal law, the duty of good faith has become a meta-prin-
ciple in Chinese jurisprudence.  Application of transplanted legal concepts,
such as the principle of good faith, in Chinese law shows how the applica-
tion of law necessarily depends on the interrelationship between the legal,
cultural, political, and economic dimensions of society.
Chinese commercial law, including contract, company, and property
laws, may very well have to play an outsized role for China to transition to a
full-fledged rule of law society.  The reasons are three-fold: (1) recognizing
personal rights in the transition to a market economy is important; (2)
private law is relatively unthreatening to the current power structure; and
(3) applying private law may serve as a training device to improve the legal
reasoning skills of the Chinese judiciary.
Confucian cultural norms have been waning because the Chinese peo-
ple have increasingly used the court system to resolve contract disputes.
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The recognition of personal property rights and greater acceptance of the
right to seek legal redress has increased private autonomy in Chinese soci-
ety, leading to economic growth due to the creation of an entrepreneurial
spirit.  As such, people are enabled to move above the “status” into which
they were born.  Increased mobility from rural to urban centers has aided
the movement from societal status to the recognition of individualism.  The
enactment of business and contract laws, along with the recognition of pri-
vate property, have been the major forces driving China’s rapid economic
growth.  Thus, the Chinese government has an interest in the judiciary
applying laws efficiently and properly.
Finally, the improvement in legal reasoning skills in the judiciary,
which the Supreme People’s Court aids by offering legal education and
guidance through the issuance of “Interpretations” and Guiding Opinions,
has led to the judiciary delivering more consistent and objective decisions.
With these new skill sets, courts will likely move away from extralegal
sources of law and issue decisions based on the “rule of law.”  This will
occur in various areas of law, including human rights.  However, the lack of
an independent court system hampers the impact that the judiciary’s
improved knowledge of China’s Western-style laws and improved legal rea-
soning skills will have on the overall legal system.  There have been some
moves in the direction of greater independence, but for the time being, the
continued professionalization of the judiciary is the most likely area of
improvement.  At the same time, it is important to realize that a more inde-
pendent and objective judiciary is unlikely to change the Chinese concept
of the rule of law, which does not assume the eventual creation of a liberal
democracy.
